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ABSTRACT
TRACKING THE SUMMARY STATISTICS IN LONG-TERM MEMORY
Haiyun Zeng
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill

Decades of research have demonstrated humans’ extraordinary ability to extract
summary statistics across individual experiences. Less is known about how exactly the
items contribute to the summary statistics and how the relationship between memory for
the items and memory for the summary statistics evolves and changes over time. I
propose that memory of summary statistics that are initially extracted from individual
instances starts to guide memory for individual items over time, and not all items
contribute to the summary statistics equally. Sources of item distinctiveness influence the
summary statistics extraction in terms of the contribution of each item and the accuracy
of summary statistics. The three empirical chapters enlighten our understanding of
summary statistics extraction in long-term memory by bridging fields ranging from
perception and memory to emotion and motivation.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction

What comes to your mind when you think of an average bear, and how does this
representation relate to the individual bears that you have encountered? The “average
bear” that first comes to your mind may be similar to the bears you know, such as your
teddy bear or the bear you saw on TV yesterday. However, it is not exactly the same with
all of them. How does this memory of the average bear form from the individual bears
you have seen?
How learners extract summary statistics from individual instances is a fundamental
question in psychology. Research in various fields in cognition, such as perception,
memory, and concept, has studied summary statistics as the “gist”, “prototype,” and
“schema” of individual experiences (Armstrong et al., 1983; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014;
Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Among the summary statistics,
“average” plays a special role in human cognition and behavior. This is demonstrated by
extensive work in various fields of psychology, such as concepts, perception, and
attractiveness. For example, Memory for instances of pre-existing semantic categories
(e.g., strawberry) is biased towards the center of the category (e.g., average size of fruit)
(Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009). Perception work shows that people’s memory of newly
learned items such as the size of circles and emotional expressions is biased towards the
average of the group of these instances (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Corbin & Crawford).
Average faces are perceived to be more attractive (Valentine et al., 2004), and this
preference for average may be linked to their visual experience with these faces within
cultures (Apicella, et al., 2007).
1

Given the importance of average, less is known about how such average is formed and
computed from observing, experiencing, and learning about individual items and events
over time. In particular, how does each individual experiences contribute to the summary
statistics in long-term memory? If humans can extract summary statistics from individual
items, will certain individual items contribute to the summary statistics more than the
others? What factors about the items influence such computation?
Perception literature has offered intriguing theories, paradigms, and models for
understanding how much each item contributes to the summary statistics, and the factors
that influence this computation. Research in ensemble perception operationalizes
summary statistics as a memory of the “average” across items that vary on a continuum,
for instance, the average size of many circles that vary in size. Based on the paradigms,
ensemble perception work has developed models to estimate the weights of the individual
items and has found evidence that not all items contribute to the summary statistics
equally (Alvarez, 2011; Whitney & Leib, 2018). Factors such as displayed order,
accuracy, deviancy, and attention, will influence the weight of items in the summary
statistics. Items that are presented at the beginning and at the end of the sequence of the
items weigh more in the summary statistics (Hubert-Wallander & Boynton, 2015; Tong
et al., 2019). Items with more reliability and more similarity to the summary statistics
weigh more in the summary statistics (de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011). Items that
received more attention shift the summary statistics of a group of emotional faces more
(Ying, 2022). Moreover, “outlier” items, which are items that are more deviant from the
other items, are discarded in forming the summary statistics (Haberman & Whitney,
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2010). These results suggest that not all items weigh equally in forming the summary
statistics and the properties of the items influence the weights.
In long-term memory research, there have been some studies that suggest that the
property of the items may change their contribution to the summary statistics. For
example, items that are “outliers” relative to the spatial pattern of all other items in
learning can greatly disrupt rodents’ pattern identification process (Richards et al., 2014).
Humans’ memory of summary statistics changes after learning an item that is inconsistent
with other items and also this change is sensitive to consolidation time (Richter et al.,
2019). However, not much work has systematically investigated how exactly these
outliers contribute to the summary statistics, similar to research in ensemble perception.
Exploring the differential weighing of items in long-term memory can enlighten our
understanding of the possible common mechanisms of summary statistics computation
between perception and cognition. These two fields study summary statistics in parallel
and there are already striking similarities in the findings. In both fields, learners can
preserve accurate memory of summary statistics while losing the accuracy of item
memory. In long-term memory literature, it was discovered that humans were capable of
reporting the prototype even when they forgot the individual items one year after learning
the individual items (Lutz et al., 2017). On the other hand, Perception researchers found
that humans can rapidly compute the summary statistics from seeing a group of
individual instances. For example, participants can accurately report the average circle
size after briefly (e.g., 500 ms) seeing a dozen of circles of varying sizes (Ariely, 2001).
Despite the similarities, it is unclear whether these findings in perception and memory are
governed by the same mechanisms. Currently, perception literature has developed
3

systematic methods for understanding the weights of the items in the summary statistics.
Investigating how the items contribute to the summary statistics using similar paradigms
in long-term memory will offer new evidence for the connection between the two fields.
Furthermore, exploring this mechanism of differential weighing in long-term memory
could be important for other fields in psychology, such as categorization. According to
the prototype model in categorization literature, people extract the “central
representation” and may utilize this representation to categorize and generalize new
exemplars (Homa et al., 2019; Posner & Keele, 1968; Smith & Minda, 1998). When
testing the theory that learners used prototypes to make categorization decisions,
categorization research does not usually examine how the exemplars contributed to the
prototype. However, recent work in this field suggested the way the exemplars are
presented (i.e., repeated exposure) may make a difference in learners’ categorization
performance (Homa et al., 2019). Thus, understanding how this prototype is computed
from individual items may improve the performance of the prototype model. For
example, the prototype model in categorization literature often assumes equal
contribution from the items to the summary statistics. The prototype defined in these
studies usually assumes equal weights over the items (Nosofsky, 1987; Smith & Minda,
2000; Tong et al., 2019). If similar to ensemble perception literature, when the items were
presented influenced their contribution to the summary statistics, including this
assumption of differential weights may improve the prototype models and thus add to the
categorization literature.
Investigating the mechanism of differential weights in long-term memory can provide
insights into the adaptive values of summary statistics extraction. If some items are
4

remembered more accurately compared to other items, then giving more weight to these
items may improve the accuracy of the overall summary statistics (Alvarez, 2011).
However, differential weights in items can distort the summary statistics and lead to
biases. If an outlier item greatly disrupts rodents’ seeking pattern for platforms (Richards
et al., 2014), wouldn’t this lead to a lower survival chance because the majority of the
resources still follow the overall pattern? Providing evidence of what factors will lead to
differential weights will be the first step toward understanding the adaptive values of
summary statistics extraction.
Chapter 2 aims to understand the role of the formation of memory of summary
statistics in long-term memory and how the relationship between the memory of
summary statistics and the memory of individual instances evolve and influence each
other over one to two months. Prior research in ensemble perception shows that learners
discount the outliers when forming the summary statistics (Haberman & Whitney, 2010),
whereas scarce evidence from long-term memory work shows that these items greatly
distort the summary statistics more than other items (Richards et al., 2014). To resolve
the discrepancy, we examined the influence of an“outlier” item on the summary statistics
in long-term memory. Inspired by perception literature, this study operationalized items
to be spatial locations on a screen and summary statistics to be the center of these
locations. Moreover, research in ensemble perception shows that memory of the items is
biased toward the summary statistics of the groups of items (Brady & Alvarez, 2011;
Corbin & Crawford 2018). However, not much is known about how the occurrence of an
outlier will influence this bias. Our study tracked the influence of an outlier item on the
memory of the summary statistics over time. We found that the existence of an outlier
5

changed the memory of summary statistics. Specifically, the outlier consistently weighed
more in memory of summary statistics compared to other items over time. However, all
the items were increasingly biased towards the center without the outlier over time. These
results shed light on how items that are more deviant influence the overall summary
statistics in long-term memory.
Chapter 2 provides a start for us to understand the contribution of items to the
summary statistics quantitatively. The findings of the outlier lead to more questions: does
the outlier weigh more because it is more salient compared to other items? Will other
sources of distinctiveness influence how much the items contribute to the gist memory?
Will properties of items, such as attention, accuracy, and frequency influence their
contribution to the summary contribution? Chapter 2 includes a weighted model on items
based on accuracy but it did not show an influence of accuracy on the weights, potentially
because the variance in item accuracy occurred naturally and we did not directly
manipulate the accuracy. In order to understand how the properties of items influence
their contributions to the summary statistics, it will be useful to have a study that
systematically manipulates the properties of the items and disentangle their influence. In
particular, the reward will be a particularly interesting source of distinctiveness, because
work on motivational learning has shown that it recruits a similar brain network as gist
extraction (Murty et al., 2016; Tse et al., 2007, 2011; Zeithamova et al. 2012).
Chapter 3 aims to further disentangle the influence of item properties on their
contributions to the summary statistics, such as rewards, attention, and frequency. For
example, if your teddy bear always gives you a warm emotional reward, will it contribute
more to your memory of an average bear? Much evidence has shown that reward during
6

encoding enhances memory for the items (Murty et al., 2011), but not much research
examines its consequence on the summary statistics. Reward, by increasing attention or
accuracy of particular items, may increase their weights in summary statistics (Alverez,
2011). Alternatively, reward, by recruiting a similar brain network shown to be related to
summary statistics extraction (Tse et al., 2007, 2011; Zeithamova et al. 2012), may
facilitate the integration of items and thus preserves the weights of the reward items to
match the other items (Clewett & Murty, 2019). On the contrary, the reward may result in
a separation between the emphasized item and the other items, which may result in a
discard of the emphasized item (Haberman & Whitney, 2010). Our study aims to
disentangle these possibilities by measuring the weights of the rewarded items in
contributing to the summary statistics, using the same spatial memory paradigm as in
Chapter 2. We discovered that the rewarded item, despite a higher accuracy compared to
other items with no reward, did not contribute to the summary statistics more. This is in
contrast with other conditions which strengthened item memories with other
reinforcement, such as frequency and attention. Items with higher frequency contribute to
the summary statistics more. Our results are more consistent with the integration account.
Moreover, ensemble perception literature suggests that the mechanism of summary
statistics extraction may vary by feature domains, from low-level processing of size and
orientation to high-level processing of facial expression (Haberman & Alvarez, 2015).
Little work has explicitly tested whether the summary statistics extraction in long-term
memory varies across feature domains as well. For example, will the extraction of overall
emotions follow a similar rule to the extraction of a pattern of spatial locations? In
addition, it is underexplored in long-term memory how the feature domains interact with
7

each other in forming summary statistics. The broaden-and-build theory proposes
positive emotions will broaden the scope of attention and thus encourage global
processing, whereas negative emotions narrow the scope of attention and are likely to
lead to local processing of emotions (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998). Ensemble
perception work demonstrates a similar difference in positive and negative emotions in
the extraction of summary statistics (Peng et al., 2022). However, not much work has
been done to explicitly test this theory in the summary extraction of emotions in longterm memory, potentially because of a lack of opportunities to directly measure and
compare negative and positive emotions in long and emotionally varied events.
Examining whether emotions also influence the extraction of summary statistics in longterm memory will broaden the scope of this theory.
Chapter 4 aims to understand humans extract the summary statistics of emotions from
daily experiences over an extended period of time, and whether this extraction varies in
positive and negative emotions. Prior literature on emotional memory shows evidence
that the “peak” of an experience, which is the most intense and extreme moment,
uniquely contributes to the overall evaluation of the emotion, for events in the lab or in
real life that lasts a shorter amount of time. Our study intended to integrate this line of
work with other long-term memory research in cognition that studies how humans extract
summary statistics from individual items. We tracked 160 MTurk participants’ daily
emotions during the first two months of the COVID-19 pandemic, their recall of these
daily emotions, and their recall of their average emotions at a 1-week and 1-month delay.
Our analysis showed that the “peak” still uniquely contributes to the summary statistics
over an extended period of time for negative emotions and the recall for summary
8

statistics was more negative than participants’ experience, although we did not find
similar effects for positive emotions. On the other hand, we found that the recall of datespecific emotions was more negative than the actual date-specific emotion, but this
negative bias decreased over time. These findings provide new insights into the
extraction of summary statistics in memory and emotion.
Through three empirical chapters, we provide new evidence for summary statistics
extraction in human memory in terms of how the properties of items contribute to
summary statistics. Our findings bridge research in areas of psychology ranging from
perception and memory to emotion and reward, providing important new insights into our
ability both to learn about distinct events and to generalize across similar experiences in
different domains in psychology.
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Chapter 2: Tracking the relation between gist and item memory over the course of
long-term memory consolidation

Abstract
Our experiences in the world support memories not only of specific episodes but also
of the generalities (the ‘gist’) across related experiences. It remains unclear how these two
types of memories evolve and influence one another over time. In two experiments, 173
human participants encoded spatial locations from a distribution and reported both item
memory (specific locations) and gist memory (center for the locations) across one to two
months. Experiment 1 demonstrated that after one month, gist memory was preserved

relative to item memory, despite a persistent positive correlation between them. Critically,
item memories were biased towards the gist over time. Experiment 2 showed that a spatial
outlier item changed this relationship and that the extraction of gist is sensitive to the
regularities of items. Our results suggest that the gist starts to guide item memories over
longer durations as their relative strengths change.

Introduction
Our experiences in the world are perceived and remembered both as individual
items, events, and episodes, and also as aggregated collections or sets of related items with
common properties. For example, one can remember seeing a brown bear at the zoo, a
polar bear at an aquarium, an animated bear in a Winnie the Pooh movie, and on and on;
but one also can readily understand the phrase "smarter than your average bear" by
aggregating over those individual experiences. A fundamental question in cognitive
10

science is how we extract summary statistics from individual instances, both during
perception and working memory (where aggregated information is often referred to as an
“ensemble”) and during episodic encoding and retrieval (where aggregated information is
often referred to as a “schema” or as the “gist” of an experience) 1. In addition, researchers
have attempted to characterize how memory for these types of information changes over
time. For example, studies of long-term memory in both humans and animals have
demonstrated that gist memory persists or even improves over time, whereas memory for
the individual items from which the gist is built fades (Posner & Keele, 1970; Richards et
al., 2014).
What do these observations of temporal dissociations tell us about the relation
between item memory and gist memory? On the one hand, a persisting gist memory with
less accurate item memory is often taken as evidence that a gist representation becomes
independent of individual item representations as it is abstracted during encoding (Posner
& Keele, 1970) or through consolidation (Richards et al., 2014). On the other hand, a
persisting gist memory with less accurate item memory is not sufficient evidence for the
independence of a gist representation: Even when item memories become noisy and less
accurate, they still can retain enough information to support a relatively intact memory of
gist at retrieval (Alvarez, 2011; Squire, Genzel, Wixted, & Morris, 2015).
Disentangling these two possibilities based on existing evidence is difficult,
because previous studies do not have a direct measurement of the gist information retained
in item memories. In this study, we developed a paradigm to test item memory, gist

1

The “gist” in this paper means “generalities across individual instances”, instead of “lack of details”,
“less precise”, or “abstract” as in fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
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memory, and “estimated” gist memory, which is an estimate of gist memory given the
assumption that it is assembled from individual memories of constituent items. Ensemble
perception research was a source of inspiration in developing such a paradigm. Studies of
rapid perception of complex visual arrays reveal precise representations of gist (i.e.,
ensemble statistics) with less accurate item memory retrieval in working memory (Ariely,
2001). In order to investigate the relation between item and gist, ensemble perception
paradigms often operationalize the gist as the average representation across instances.
Following this reasoning, we operationalize item memory as a set of landmarks
(e.g., restaurant and university) whose locations are clustered together on a screen, and gist
memory as the center for these landmark locations. In our paradigm, participants learn this
set of landmarks, and are then asked to report the spatial center of these landmarks and
recall the locations of each landmark. Importantly, an “estimated center” can be computed
based on their retrieval of individual items, and its accuracy can thus reveal the amount of
gist information available in item memories. Thus, we can investigate the relation between
gist memories and item memories over the course of long-term memory consolidation by
measuring the relationship between the accuracy of the reported center and the estimated
center. A positive correlation between estimated and reported center accuracy could mean
that participants’ gist memory was still supported by individual item memories, or that the
gist was influencing the retrieval of items.
To probe the direction of this relationship, we developed a gist-based bias
measurement, an approach borrowed from research on hierarchical clustering models and
from semantic memory, which both reveal how gist memory influences memory for
specific items (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009; Tompary &
12

Thompson-Schill, 2021). This measure of bias indicates the magnitude of the particular
direction in which the items were attracted. Theories suggest that this influence reveals a
reconstructive memory retrieval process (Brady, Schacter, & Alvarez, 2015; Hemmer &
Steyvers, 2009; Schacter, Guerin, & Jacques, 2011) that depends on the relative strength
of item and gist memory (Tompary, Zhou, & Davachi, 2020). Consistent with this theory,
prior work in long-term memory consolidation, which examines gist memory that is newly
acquired, has shown that over time, as the strength of gist memory is preserved or improves
and/or that of item memory decreases, items that are consistent with the gist are recalled
more precisely (Richter, Bays, Jeyarathnarajah, & Simons, 2019; Sweegers & Talamini,
2014; Tompary, Zhou, & Davachi, 2020). However, these results did not demonstrate a
gist-based bias, a distortion of item memory from such a newly acquired gist. An increasing
bias of item memories towards the remembered gist — in this paradigm, the reported center
— would be strong evidence for the increasing strength of gist memory over item memories.
Our interest in examining the influence of gist memory on item memory at long delays
stems from a desire to bridge the literature reviewed above with a potentially related
literature reporting the effects of prior knowledge on memory retrieval (e.g., Huttenlocher,
Hedges, & Vevea, 2000; Tompary & Thompson-Schill, 2021).
The current study aimed to understand the relation between item and gist memory over
the course of a month. In Experiment 1, we trained three groups of participants on spatial
locations of six landmarks, and we measured the change of error in memory of these items
as well as the memory for the gist (i.e., the center participants reported) at one of three
delay periods: 24 hours, one week, or one month. We predicted that the accuracy of the
reported center would persist or improve despite the accuracy of retrieved items decreasing
13

over a month, as seen in prior work. We extended prior observations by including two new
measures—estimated center and gist-based bias—in order to explore how the relation
between memories for items and the gist changes over the course of one month. In order to
understand how influence of a gist memory on item memory changes over time, we
compared observed bias from participants with bias generated under two simulations, one
assuming that participants only had item memory, the other assuming that participants had
item memory and a separate gist representation.
In Experiment 2, we explored the influence of an “outlier” item in spatial location both
on the gist, and on the relation between item and gist memories demonstrated in
Experiment 1. Research in long-term memory (Richards et al., 2014) and working memory
(Whitney & Leib, 2018) shows that outliers that are inconsistent with the pattern across all
items differently influence the memory for the pattern, compared to items that are more
consistent with the pattern. Outliers greatly disrupted or shifted the overall pattern
(Richards et al., 2014), or were discounted in estimating the pattern (Haberman & Whitney,
2010) compared to other items. In Experiment 2 we examined the extent to which the gist
representation was influenced more or less by an outlier item over time, as well as whether
bias in item memory was to the center location including or excluding the outlier item with
the same simulation approach as in Experiment 1. Taken together, these experiments
provide new information about how item and gist memory are consolidated over time.

Results
Experiment 1 Item memories were operationalized as “landmarks” (i.e., dots associated
with unique landmark names) in six locations on a laptop screen (Fig. 1). In Session 1, 130
14

participants learned the locations of the landmarks individually through a training to
criterion procedure (see Fig. 1 and Methods for details). After training, participants were
tested on item and gist memory: First, they indicated their guess about the center of the
landmarks (gist memory test), and then they recalled each landmark location, without
feedback and in a random order (item memory test). After 24 hours (n = 44), one week (n
= 43), or one month (n = 43), participants returned for Session 2, during which they
completed the gist memory test followed by the item memory test again. This testing order
was chosen to reduce the influence of item memories on reported gist.
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Fig. 2.1. a) Schematic illustration of the procedure for Experiment 1 and 2. The
procedure of Session 1 is the same for Experiment 1 and 2 (with the exception of the
number of trials). Participants completed cycles of encoding (with feedback) and
evaluation (without feedback) until they could retrieve each landmark individually within
the training criteria. b) An illustration of the location of the stimuli (drawn to scale) for
Experiment 1 and 2. The locations (black dots) were the same for all participants, but the
mapping between the location and landmark name was randomized for each participant.
The dash lines around the dots indicate the training criteria (80 pixels for Experiment 1 and
50 pixels for Experiment 2). The green circle indicates the center of these encoded locations
and the red circle indicates the ‘local’ center of the encoded locations (excluding the outlier)
in Experiment 2.

Gist memory decreased less than item memory over time
We developed an error measurement for the accuracy of item and gist memory (Fig. 2a;
See Methods for details). All three delay groups performed above chance on both the item
memory test (compared to chance defined as the average of distance between encoded item
locations and center of the screen, and compared to chance defined as the average of
distance between each encoded item location and center of all encoded locations) and the
gist memory test (chance defined as the distance between the center of encoded locations
and center of the screen) at both Session 1 and 2 (all p < .0001; Fig 2.8). To examine how
item and gist memory changed over time, we conducted a 3 (group: 24-hour, 1-week, and
1-month) X 2 (memory type: item, center) aligned ranks transformation ANOVA of the
difference in error between Session 1 and Session 2 (because the data were not normally
16

distributed). This test revealed a main effect of group, F(2, 254) = 42.26, p < .001, a main
effect of memory type, F(1, 254) = 99.36, p < .001, and an interaction between group and
memory type, F(2, 254) = 23.76, p < .001. This interaction reveals that the error in retrieved
items increased more over time compared to error in the reported center (Fig. 2b).
Specifically, whereas each pairwise comparison between groups was significant for item
memory (Mann-Whitney tests: all p’s < .01), the only reliable group difference for gist
memory was between the 24-hour and 1-month groups (U = 685, p = .026). In addition, the
change in retrieval error of item locations was significantly higher than that of reported
center at a delay of 24 hours (Wilcoxon signed rank tests: Z = 2.14, p = .03), one week (Z
= 5.79, p < .001), and one month (Z = 6.53, p < .0001). These results showed that item
memories decreased significantly more relative to gist memory over time.

17

Fig. 2.2. Error measurements and results. a) Error measurements. b) Change in error
by group and memory type (the band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and
third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points
18

indicate outliers). Greater values indicate an increase in error in Session 2 over Session 1.
* indicates p < .05 and **** p < .0001 by Mann-Whitney tests. Fig 2.8 shows the
absolute error for both item and gist memory at Session 1 and 2. Figure 2.9 shows the
error change over time in reported gist, estimated gist, and simulated gist based on a
simple item-only simulation (discussed at the end of Experiment 1 result section).

Positive relationship between item and gist memories across one month
To explore the relation between item and gist memory over time, we used a linear model
to evaluate the effects of estimated center error, delay group, and their interaction on
reported center error. We found that estimated center error significantly predicted reported
center error (SSE = 48138, F(1, 124) = 18.31, p < .001). The effect of delay (SSE = 4873,
F(2, 124) = 0.93, p = .40) and the interaction between the estimated center error and delay
(SSE = 11729, F(2, 124) = 2.23, p = .11) on reported center error was not significant. These
results indicate a stable relation between item and gist memory over time; our subsequent
analyses will examine the source of this relation.

Item memory retrieval biased towards gist over time
The positive correlation could indicate that participants’ reported gist was still supported
by individual item memories, or alternatively that the reported gist was influencing the
retrieval of items. To examine the direction of the relation between item and gist memories,
we developed a bias measurement (see Methods for details) as an index of how much the
retrieval of each item memory is biased towards the gist representation (Fig. 2.3a). We
compared the observed bias computed from data collected from participants at each time
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point with an item-only simulated bias, which assumed learners only had item memory,
such that the magnitude of error for each simulated retrieved location would be the same
as the corresponding item memory collected from participants, but the direction of the
simulated location would be random. We also compared the observed bias to an item-plusgist simulated bias which assumed both item memory and an additional influence from the
gist memory (abbreviated as gist simulated bias below for simplicity), such that each
simulated retrieved location would be generated from the same error as in the item-only
simulation but the probability of a retrieved location being simulated is weighted by its
distance towards the reported center. Therefore, a location that is closer to the center will
have higher probability of being retrieved in the simulation (see Methods for details). We
used the reported center (rather than the true center of encoded items) in this analysis
because we found a decrease in accuracy of the reported center after one month compared
to 24 hours, as discussed above. In the next section “Follow-up bias analyses”, we repeated
the bias analysis using the true center of encoded items, for consistency with common
practices in ensemble perception research (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Lew & Vul, 2015).
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Fig. 2.3. a) Bias measurement. The bias for each recalled location is (red - yellow) /
green. The blue square is an example of a recalled item that is biased away from the
reported center and the blue triangle is an example of a recalled item that is biased
towards the reported center. Bias for each participant is an average of bias for all the
locations. b, c, d) Item-only simulated bias (Sim-I), observed bias (Obs), and gist
simulated bias (Sim-G) at each session for delay groups of 24 hours, 1 week, and 1 month
(the band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers
indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outliers). * indicates p
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< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, and **** p < .0001 by t-tests between observed bias and
simulated biases (black) and t-tests comparing the difference in observed bias and
simulated biases between sessions (red).

In order to examine whether participants’ item memory became more dissimilar over
time to what would be expected from having item representations and no separate gist
representation, we conducted a 2 (session: Session 1 vs. Session 2) x 3 (delay groups: 24
hours, 1 week, and 1 month) ANOVA for the difference between the observed bias and
item-only simulated bias. This test revealed a significant interaction between delay group
and session, F(2, 254) = 3.53, p = 0.03, indicating that the difference between item-only
simulated bias and the observed bias significantly increased over time (Fig 2.3). Followup t-tests for all delay groups revealed that for the one month group only, the difference
between the observed bias and the item-only simulated data was significantly higher for
Session 2 compared to Session 1, t(80.76) = 3.18, p < .01. No across-session comparisons
for any other delay groups were significant (ps > .65). Furthermore, only the observed bias
at 1 month was significantly greater than the item-only simulated bias, t(42) = 3.73, p
< .001 (Fig 2.3b).
In order to examine whether participants’ item memory became more similar over time
to what would be expected from having both item and gist representations, we conducted
an analogous 2 x 3 ANOVA for the difference between gist simulated bias and the observed
bias. This test revealed a significant interaction between delay group and session, F(2, 254)
= 6.33, p < 0.01, indicating that the difference between gist simulated bias and the observed
bias significantly decreased over time. Follow-up t-tests for all delay groups revealed that
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for the one month group only, the difference between the observed bias and the gist
simulated bias was significantly lower for Session 2 compared to Session 1, t(82.50) = 4.39,
p < .001. No across-session comparisons for any other delay groups were significant
(ps > .65). (Note. Because the level of gist influence added to the gist simulated bias was
arbitrarily selected, we did not expect the endpoint value for the observed bias to match the
gist simulated bias; we will return to this point in the Discussion.). These results indicate
that participants’ biases were increasingly consistent with the assumption of a separate gist
representation and increasingly inconsistent with reliance only on item memories. By one
month (but not after one day or one week), item memory retrieval was biased towards the
reported gist2.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 reveal that although there is a persistent
relation between item and gist memory during memory consolidation, the nature of this
relation changes over time. We suggest that early in memory consolidation, retrieval of gist
depends on the successful retrieval of individual items, but then, as item memory weakens
over time, the relatively stronger gist memory begins to guide retrieval of item memory.

2

We used this bias analysis to measure the influence of the gist—as opposed to
comparing the distance between the reported center and estimated center or their error
difference over time—for two reasons. First, our measure of bias shows the magnitude of
the particular direction the items were attracted to. Second, the estimated center was
calculated from an aggregation of item memories, which may already have been influenced
by the center of these items at a delay (as shown by the bias analysis). Therefore, comparing
the estimated center and the reported center over time would not allow us to isolate the
influence of the center. To demonstrate this point, we conducted a simulation for the
estimated center error, assuming the magnitude of error for each item memory would
remain the same but the direction of error would not be systematically influenced by the
gist. Such simulated estimated center error is significantly different from participants’
reported center error and estimated center error, which suggests that the estimated center
computed from the item memories was influenced by the center (Fig 2.9).
23

As a consequence, this new gist representation can exert influence over memories in ways
described by reconstructive memory theories.

Follow-up bias analyses
In order to test factors that may influence the gist-based bias and its generalizability, we
conducted the bias analyses as discussed above with the three following modifications (see
Methods for additional details): First, to be consistent with common practices in ensemble
perception research (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Lew & Vul, 2015), we repeated the bias
analysis using the center of encoded items (big green circle in Fig 2.2a) instead of the
reported center. Second, the assumption that each item is weighted the same may be overly
simplistic and the weight of the items may influence the representation of the gist and the
bias results. Therefore, we computed a center that was a weighted average based on the
accuracy of each item, such that items with higher recalled accuracy would be weighted
more in the computed center compared to items with lower accuracy. We repeated the bias
analysis using this weighted center. Third, the mental representation of the locations that
participants encoded may not be a linear transformation of the actual item locations on the
computer screen, and this nonlinearity may account for the observed biases in location
memory. To capture the potential non-linear warping of the stimulus space, we generalized
the Euclidean error measure to a Minkowski’s measure, where error 𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) =
1.5

√(𝑎1 − 𝑏1 )1.5 + (𝑎2 − 𝑏2 )1.5 , and conducted the same bias analysis.
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Across the three analyses, we found the same pattern: The observed bias became more
and more dissimilar from the item-only simulated bias, indicated by a significant
interaction between delay group and session in the three ANOVAs (all Fs > 6.42, ps < .01),
and became more and more similar to the gist simulated bias over time, indicated by a
significant interaction between delay group and session in ANOVAs (all Fs > 6.81, ps
< .01). Furthermore, the observed bias at one month differed from the item-only simulated
bias (all ts > 3.85, ps < 001), but not at other delays. In addition, the bias computed under
these three approaches are highly correlated with the bias with reported center in the prior
section (all rs > 0.9, ps < .001), suggesting the varied approaches generated similar bias to
the bias in the prior section. In summary, the result of increasing gist-based bias over time
replicates in analyses using the center of encoded locations, weighted center based on item
accuracy, and with a Minkowski’s measure in non-Euclidean space.

Experiment 2 The stimuli and procedure of Experiment 2 (Fig. 2.1) were similar to those
of Experiment 1 but differed in two major ways (see Methods for more details). Firstly, we
used a repeated measures design in Experiment 2 so that we could observe changes in
memory at short (one day) and long (1-2 month) retention intervals within each subject (N
= 43). Secondly, one of the landmarks was an “outlier”, meaning that its location fell far
out of the range of the cluster where the majority of the landmarks were (see Experiment
2 item locations in Fig. 2.1). The inclusion of an outlier location enabled us to examine the
influence that a single “atypical” item has not only on the initial estimation of the center
(as in Haberman & Whitney, 2010; Richards et al., 2014; Whitney & Leib, 2018) but also
on the source of bias in item memory at long delays. In addition, in Session 1, item memory
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was derived from the item memory test in the last round of evaluation during training (see
the procedure for Experiment 2 in Fig. 2.1) to streamline the session.

Gist memory decreased less than item memory over time
In Experiment 2, we used the same error measurement for the accuracy of item and gist
memory as in Experiment 1 (Fig. 2.2a; see Methods for details). Participants performed
above chance in both item (i.e., the average of distance between encoded item locations
and center of the screen; the average of distance between encoded item locations and center
of encoded item locations) and gist memory (i.e., the distance between the center of
encoded locations and center of the screen) tests at all sessions (all p < .0001; Fig 2.10).
To examine how item and gist memory changed over time, we conducted a 2 (delay: short
(24 hours) or long (1-2 months) x 2 (memory type: item, center) aligned ranks
transformation ANOVA with repeated measures of error change. This test revealed a main
effect of delay, F(1, 126) = 16.20, p < .001, memory type, F(1, 126) = 68.96, p < .001, and
an interaction between delay and memory type, F(1, 126) = 27.40, p < .001. This interaction
indicates that the error of individual item retrieval increased more over time compared to
the reported center (Fig. 2.4a). Specifically, whereas item memory error change was higher
after 24-hour compared to one to two months by Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z = 5.28, p
< .0001), no such significant difference was detected for gist memory error change (Z =
0.72, p = .47). Experiment 2 thus replicated the finding observed in Experiment 1 that item
memories decreased significantly more relative to gist memory over time.
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Fig. 2.4. Change in error by delay and memory type (the band indicates the median,
the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile
range, and the solid points indicate outliers). Greater values indicate an increase in error
from Session 1 after delay. **** p < .0001 by Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Dots and lines
indicate participants. Fig 2.10 shows the absolute error for both item and memory at all
sessions.

Positive relationship between item and gist memories across time
To explore the relation between item and gist memory, we fit a linear mixed effects
model on reported center error with fixed effects of delay (24 hours and 1 to 2 months),
estimated center error, and their interaction with a random effect of participant to account
for repeated measures within participants. We found a significant effect of estimated center
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error (SSE = 29114.3, F(1, 69.92) = 12.08, p < .001), but not a main effect of delay (SSE =
1420.9, F(1, 59.59) = 0.59, p = .45) or an interaction between the estimated center error
and delay (SSE = 1102.9, F(1, 68.80) = 0.46, p = .50). The result of a persistent relationship
between estimated center error and reported center error at short and long retention
intervals was replicated in a within-participants design.

Item memory retrieval was biased towards the local gist over time
To examine whether the influence of gist on item memories changes over time, we
applied the same bias analysis as in Experiment 1, using participants’ reported center of all
the retrieved items as bias center (Fig. 2.1b). We conducted a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA on the difference between the observed bias and item-only simulated bias across
sessions (after training, 24 hours, and 1 month) and also the same ANOVA on the
difference between the observed bias and gist simulated bias. In contrast to Experiment 1,
the difference between item-only simulated bias and the observed bias did not significantly
change over time, F(2, 84) = 1.34, p = 0.28 (Fig. 2.5a). Furthermore, unlike in Experiment
1, the observed bias was not significantly higher compared to the item-only simulated bias
at long retention, t(42) = -0.47, p = .64 (Fig. 2.5a). At the same time, the difference between
gist simulated bias and the observed bias only marginally decreased over time, F(2, 84) =
3.04, p = 0.05 (Fig. 2.5a). This may be driven by an unpredicted negative bias (i.e., bias
away from the reported gist) immediately after learning, t(42) = -2.09, p = .04, and after a
short retention interval, t(42) = -2.27, p = .03, revealed by t-tests against the item-only
simulation.
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What might explain the different bias results between Experiments 1 and 2? We suspect
this is the result of the outlier item. Prior work in visual working memory research showed
that outliers were discounted in estimating the gist (Haberman & Whitney, 2010). In our
Experiment 1, where there was not an outlier, we saw that the item retrieval was biased
towards the center of all of the items; however, in Experiment 2, the center of most of the
items would be the local center excluding the outlier (Fig 2.1b). It is possible that for
participants in Experiment 2, the items were biased towards the local clustering center
excluding the outlier.
In order to test this possibility, we conducted an analysis that computed the gist-based
bias of the items using the local center (the true center from the encoded items disregarding
the outlier). As in Experiment 1, the difference between item-only simulated bias and
observed bias significantly increased over time, F(2, 84) = 8.51, p < 0.001 (Fig. 2.5b).
Follow-up paired t-tests showed that the difference between item-only simulated bias and
observed bias at long retention was significantly higher compared to the difference after
training, t(42) = -3.67, p < .001, and compared to the difference at short retention, t(42) =
-2.87, p < .01). The same comparison between after training and 24 hours was not
significant, t(42) = -1.49, p = .14).
On the other hand, the difference between gist simulated bias and observed bias
decreased over time, F(2, 84) = 13.80, p < 0.001 (Fig. 2.5b). Follow-up paired t-tests
showed that the difference between gist simulated bias and observed bias at long retention
was significantly smaller than the difference after training, t(42) = -4.59, p < .001, and
compared to the difference at short retention, t(42) = -3.81, p < .001. The same comparison
between after training and 24 hours was not significant, t(42) = -1.62, p = .11. Furthermore,
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only the observed bias at the long retention interval was significantly greater than the itemonly simulated bias (t(42) = 2.28, p = .03; Fig. 2.5b). This increased bias was observed
even for the outlier item: Retrieval of the location of the outlier item was significantly more
biased towards the local center after a long retention interval compared to a short retention
interval, revealed by a comparison to the item-only simulated bias (Z = 2.46, p = .01).
These results indicate that item memories in Experiment 2 were biased, at long retention
intervals, towards the center as in Experiment 1, but that the “center” in Experiment 2 was
not the global center but instead the local center excluding the outlier item.
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Fig. 2.5. a) Global observed bias (Obs), item-only simulated bias (Sim-I), and gist
simulated bias (Sim-G) at each session. Global bias uses the report center. b) Local
observed bias (Obs), item-only simulated bias (Sim-I), and gist simulated bias (Sim-G) at
each session. Local bias excludes the outlier item when estimating the center. The band
indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers
indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outliers. * indicates p
< .05, *** p < .001, and **** p < .0001 by paired t-tests between observed data and
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simulation (black) and repeated measures ANOVA comparing the difference in data and
simulations across sessions (red).

Over-weighting of the outlier in gist memory
Our analysis of item bias suggests that the outlier is “discarded” as a member of the
cluster of locations, which is consistent with some prior studies (e.g., Haberman &
Whitney, 2010); however, other work has shown that outliers can greatly disrupt or shift
the representation of a set of events (Richards et al., 2014). Could both be happening in
this paradigm? In order to explore the influence of the outlier on the representation of
gist, we applied a weighted model adapted from working memory literature and
computed an estimation of the weight of the outlier in the reported gist (Haberman &
Whitney, 2010; see Methods for details).
The estimated weight of the outlier was significantly higher than 0.125 (i.e. the level
assuming equal weights across all items) immediately after learning, t(42) = 2.14, p = .04,
after a short retention interval, t(42) = 2.89, p < .01, and after a long retention interval, t(42)
= 3.83, p < .001, (Fig. 2.6). The change in outlier weight after short compared to long
retention intervals did not significantly differ (t(42) = 0.92, p = .36). In other words, the
outlier has not been discarded from the set, but quite to the contrary, the outlier has a
disproportionate influence on the explicit retrieval of gist after a delay. In contrast, the
implicit effect of the center on bias in item retrieval seems to emerge from a center that is
uninfluenced by the outlier (Fig. 2.5b). These results revealed that the outlier consistently
influenced participants’ reported center more than other items at all tested time points.
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Fig. 2.6. Outlier weight values at each session. The band indicates the median, the box
indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range.
Dots and lines indicate participants.

Taken together, Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 that gist
memory decreased less compared to item memories over time (Fig. 2.4) and a positive
relationship between item and gist memories in a within-subject design. The “outlier” item
changed the relationship between items and reported global center after a long retention
interval. By one to two months, items were no longer biased towards the global reported
center which overweighted the outlier. Instead, they were biased towards the local center
excluding the outlier over time.
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Discussion
We examined how human learners extract the “gist” (generalities, common properties,
or summary statistics) across individual instances, and how memory for these instances
and for the gist evolve and influence each other over time through two behavioral
experiments spanning one to two months. We demonstrated that the accuracy of item
memory (memory for spatial locations on a screen) decreased more compared to the
accuracy of gist memory (center of the locations) over time, though there was a persistent
positive correlation between them. Critically, item memories were increasingly biased
towards the gist over time. Participants’ biases grew less similar over time to a simulation
relying only on memory for individual items and more similar to a simulation assuming a
separate gist representation. In the presence of an outlier item, the local gist, excluding the
outlier, became the source of bias, instead of the gist participants directly reported, which
consistently overweighted the outlier across time. We think that gist memories, initially
built from item memory, gradually developed to guide item memory as their relative
strength changed over time.
Consistent with prior research (Antony et al., 2020; Berens et al., 2020; Lutz,
Diekelmann, Hinse-Stern, Born, & Rauss, 2017; Posner & Keele, 1970), item memory
became less accurate over time while gist memory remained relatively intact over time.
Our findings converge with this prior research even when using an explicit instruction to
retrieve gist memory, rather than inferring gist from another measure as in prior research.
A shortcoming of prior research is that the relation between item and gist memory over
time is rarely assessed. We showed that the relationship between item memory and gist
memory persisted across delay periods despite decreased accuracy in item memory. This
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relationship could have resulted from the influence of gist memory on the retrieval of item
memory, from the influence of item memory on gist memory, or both. Our gist-based bias
results shed light on the direction of this relationship: Item memory retrieval was biased
towards gist only after one month, which suggested that the correlation at one month was
likely to be due to the influence of gist memory on the retrieval of item memory.
Our findings that items are increasingly biased towards the gist as the accuracy of item
memories decreases over time provide new evidence for the memory reconstruction
framework, which proposes that memory retrieval is a combination of different sources
with varying strength (Brady et al., 2015; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009; Huttenlocher et al.,
2000; Tompary et al., 2020). Our work extends prior evidence of increased schematization
in memory consolidation (Richards et al., 2014; Richter et al., 2019; Tompary et al., 2020)
by demonstrating a new form of influence from the gist on item memory: gist-based bias.
In contrast to prior memory consolidation research that showed increased schematization
earlier than one month (Graves et al., Richter et al., 2019; Tompary et al., 2020), the gistbased bias in our current work did not increase by 24 hours or one week. This discrepancy
could be because the intensive training participants experienced in our paradigm increased
the strength of item memories relative to gist memory during learning, and only after a
long retention interval did the strength of item memory decrease to an extent that allowed
bias to manifest.
The increased bias may reflect a slow systems consolidation process that results in a
qualitatively different memory representation after longer retention intervals (Richards et
al., 2014). An increased reliance on neocortical areas over time would be expected to
strengthen gist memory, to the extent that neocortex tends to represent information in a
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‘semanticized’ form (Sekeres, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 2017). The results are also
consistent, however, with a change in reliance on different forms of memory within the
same memory systems. The current results are not diagnostic on this point — they are
consistent with a range of theories on the interplay between episodic and semantic
memories over time (Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch & Rugg, 2019; Richards et al., 2014;
Robin & Moscovitch, 2017; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011; Sekeres, Winocur, &
Moscovitch, 2018).
Our results of increasing gist-based bias over time parallel visual working memory work,
which shows evidence of a hierarchical organization of memory: items are more biased
towards their center as uncertainty increases in order to increase the overall precision of
retrieval (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Lew & Vul, 2015; Orhan & Jacobs, 2013). Our results
detected a similar gist-based bias in long-term memory consolidation. Moreover, in
Experiment 2, after a long retention interval, the reported gist overweighted the outlier,
whereas the item memories were biased towards the local gist which discounted the outlier.
This finding also mirrors prior ensemble perception results that outliers are discounted or
excluded in estimating summary statistics (De Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011) and
suggests that the gist influencing item retrieval is not a simple average of the items. The
results might reveal two different sampling strategies for gist extraction. Because
participants had explicit knowledge about the outlier, they might have given more weight
to the outlier in explicitly recalling and reporting the gist, similar to the change in the
pattern by inconsistent items observed in long-term memory work (Richards et al., 2014).
In contrast, the local center that influenced the items might reflect an implicit
representation with a sampling strategy discounting the outlier, consistent with findings in
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perception work (De Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; Haberman & Whitney, 2010). Our
results suggest that visual working memory and long-term memory might be underpinned
by a similar reconstructive mechanism and open up new directions to bridge the two fields.
One limitation of the current experiments is that the testing order (i.e., gist memory
before item memory) might have encouraged the retrieval of the items to be consistent
with the gist (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Mutluturk & Boduroglu, 2014). We initially
chose this order because we were most interested in the change in gist representation and
wanted to minimize the influence of item memories on gist estimation in later recall. We
also were concerned that the extent that these two tests influenced the other was not
symmetric; in other words, the influence of item memory on gist might be more
pronounced than the influence of gist on item memory. Because the testing order is the
same for the three different delay intervals, we reasoned that the changes in item memory
and bias across delay groups could not simply be a result of the order. In addition, in
Experiment 2, the items were not biased towards the center participants reported,
suggesting that even if the gist test occurring before item test influences the recall for the
items, the influence may be minor. However, multiplicative effects, such as floor or
ceiling effects present only at one time point, could still influence the results and the
influence from the testing order may still exist. Although the testing order is likely not to
influence the change over time, the bias for all delay groups may be lower overall under
the reverse testing order. More studies with counterbalanced testing order will be helpful
to evaluate this possibility.
Future research can be done to test the generality of our findings to other domains of
human cognition. It would be interesting to explore whether our findings, which considered
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gist memory as a spatial average, would generalize to a broader definition of gist, such as
gist-like memory for events (Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, Nadel, 2016). For example,
when first learning what a birthday party is from attending a few, the “gist” representation
of a birthday party may be dominated by memory for a few parties, but over time the gist
becomes a more stable representation that can influence retrieval of those specific birthday
party events. In addition, the dissociation of gist-based bias in Experiment 2 also mirrors
the dissociable implicit and explicit attitude in social categories (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006). More work could further disentangle these processes in long-term
memory consolidation, which could enlighten our understanding of the cognitive
mechanism underlying the formation of gist in social categories.
We began by posing the question of how one extracts a summary statistic from
individual instances, but without a doubt, the summary statistic we have used here to
answer this question—the arithmetic average of x,y coordinates—is overly simplistic.
Firstly, the item-only simulations in our work are oversimplified compared to the itemonly models in the categorization literature (Nosofsky, 1988). There surely could be other
more sophisticated item-only models that can fit our data. However, our results put a new
constraint (i.e., a gist-based bias) for item-only models in long-term memory. Secondly,
our implementation of a gist representation in our bias simulations was very simplistic. For
example, we assumed an arbitrary amount of gist influence, implementing a more
qualitative than quantitative assessment of the presence of a gist representation. Additional
experiments with more within-subject statistical power could be used to constrain models
that quantify the precise amount of gist influence (as a parameter in individual model fits).
Thirdly, this gist influence may be influenced by many other factors, such as the variability
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in item locations, the accuracy and the confidence of item memories, the distance from the
items to the center or to the screen boundary (Intraub & Richardson, 1989), individual
differences in cognitive functions (e.g., executive control), and the demand characteristics
of explicitly recalling the center. The current design did not allow for enough variability to
tease apart these possibilities, but future research systematically manipulating these factors
will be helpful in addressing these issues. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
principles that govern aggregation of individual spatial locations do not in any obvious way
translate to the nature of summary statistics for other episodic memories (like that average
bear!). Although there is much work to be done to understand the ways in which we
aggregate information across multiple experiences, the current experiments should provide
a useful launching off pad for future explorations of this question.
In summary, we have shown that memory for individual items and memory for the gist
of a set of items changed over the course of long-term memory consolidation. We propose
that the gist that was initially extracted from item memories gradually started to guide item
memory retrieval over longer durations as their relative memory strength changed. These
findings bridge research in areas of cognitive science ranging from perception and working
memory to episodic and semantic memory, providing important new insights into our
ability both to learn about distinct events and to generalize across similar experiences.

Methods
Experiment 1.
Participants. In Experiment 1, we recruited 147 members of the University of
Pennsylvania community (18-30 years old; normal or corrected to normal vision) to
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participate in the experiment for monetary compensation. Participants selected to sign up
for a second session that followed their first session by either 24 hours, one week, or one
month3. Sample size was based on Experiment 2 which was conducted first 4. We excluded
10 participants because of low performance on Session 1 (i.e., reported gist was out of the
scope of the learned landmarks) and then 7 participants because of individual and gist
performance of any sessions lower than 3 SD below average. Our reported results thus
include 130 participants, with 44 participants in the 24-hours group (age: M = 21.3, SD =
2.9, gender: 61% females), 43 participants in the one-week group (age: M = 21.9, SD = 2.6,
gender: 67% females), and 43 participants in the one-month group (age: M = 21.4, SD =
2.0, gender: 74% females). All procedures were approved by University of Pennsylvania
IRB (IRB #705915, Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Functions of Frontal Cortex).

Procedure. The experimental procedure is displayed in Fig. 2.1. All participants completed
Sessions 1 and 2; the only difference between groups was the time delay between sessions.
Session 1 included training and testing. During training, participants were trained to
retrieve six landmark locations consecutively on a laptop until their retrieval error for each
landmark was fewer than 80 pixels in any direction. 80 pixels was chosen to be the criterion
because it was less than 1/2 of the shortest distance between any pairs of the encoded
locations, and thus would ensure that participants could differentiate the locations in recall.

3

Because participants were not randomly assigned into three different delay conditions, a
difference in expectation may influence their learning and consolidation. We did not find evidence,
however, for any differences in behavior between groups at initial learning (Fig 2.8). Also, the
results from Experiment 1 replicated in Experiment 2 with a within-subject design.
4
Namely, we set the number of subjects after exclusion in Experiment 2 as a minimum sample
size. After we reached the sample size, we continued to recruit participants until the end of the
academic term.
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The training included three phases. In Phase 1, the landmarks appeared on the screen one
at a time, and participants were required to click on each landmark to proceed. Fig 2.1
illustrates the landmark locations; note, on each trial, only one location was presented
(never the full map), and the center of the encoded locations was never presented to
participants. In Phase 2, we asked participants to recall the location for each landmark by
clicking on the screen when given its name as a cue, and we gave them feedback about
their guesses: participants had 3 attempts to recall each landmark location. For each attempt,
if the distance between the recalled location and retrieved location satisfied the training
criterion (i.e., 80 pixels), the correct location would be shown on the screen; otherwise, a
message would be prompted that their attempt was incorrect. The correct location would
be shown on the screen after three incorrect attempts. In Phase 3, participants recalled each
landmark consecutively without feedback, one at a time. If each of the retrieved landmarks
fell in the range of 80 pixels, the participant could proceed to testing; if not, the participant
was redirected back to Phase 2 to receive more training. After participants reached the
training criterion, they completed ten unrelated arithmetic problems, in order to minimize
potential influences from working memory. Finally, participants were tested on their
memory of the locations: They indicated their guess about the center of the landmarks (gist
memory test), with an instruction “Indicate the center (average location) of the landmarks
you have seen”. Then, they separately recalled each landmark location (item memory test,
which was identical to the recall procedure in Phase 3). The order of items was randomized
in all phases in training and testing. In both tests, participants were incentivized to be
accurate through bonus payments. They would receive a bonus of 1 dollar for the gist
memory test if their error was within 100 pixels and a bonus of 1 dollar for the item memory
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test if their average error across all items was within 80 pixels. All trials were self-paced.
The total time for Session 1 was approximately 12 minutes.
After 24 hours, one week, or one month, participants returned for Session 2. Session 2
was identical to the gist test and item test in Session 1, in which participants first reported
the center and then the location of each landmark. Trials were again self-paced. The total
time for Session 2 was approximately 5 minutes. Participants could choose to quit the
experiment after Session 1 and receive 10 dollars for their time, otherwise they would be
paid after Session 2. The payment ranged from 16 to 20 dollars, depending on participants’
performance in their gist memory and item memory test.

Error Measurement. In order to measure the accuracy for item memory (memory for each
landmark), gist memory (reported memory for the center of the landmarks), and the
estimated gist (center of all the retrieved items), we developed three error measurements
as follows.
Item Memory Error (green line in Fig. 2.2a): The error for each item was defined as the
Euclidean distance between the retrieved location for each landmark and its encoded
location, where
d (a, b) = √(𝑎1 − 𝑏1 )2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑏2 )2 . Each participant’s item memory error was
computed as the average error for the six landmarks. Chance performance based on the
center of the screen is 348 pixels, which is determined by the average Euclidean distance
between the center of the laptop screen and each encoded item location. This distance
corresponds to what participants’ performance would be if they only remembered the
center of the screen and just clicked the center of screen when asked to recall an item.
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Mathematically, this distance corresponded to the average error a participant would have
if they guessed anywhere on screen. Chance performance based on the center of the screen
is 267 pixels, which is determined by the average Euclidean distance between the center of
encoded item locations and each encoded item location. This distance corresponds to what
participants’ performance would be if they only remembered the center of item locations
and just clicked that center when asked to recall an item.
Gist Memory Error (purple line in Fig. 2.2a): The error for gist memory was defined as
the reported center error, which was the Euclidean distance between the participant’s
reported center and the true center of all the encoded items. Chance performance is 270
pixels, which is the Euclidean distance between the center of the laptop screen and the true
center of all encoded locations. This distance corresponds to what participants’
performance would be if they just clicked the center of screen when asked to report the
center.
Estimated Gist Memory Error (blue line in Fig. 2.2a): The error for the estimated gist
based on items was defined as the estimated center error, which was the Euclidean distance
between the center of each participant’s retrieved item locations and the true center of all
encoded locations. In other words, the estimated center can be thought of as what the
participant’s gist estimate would be if it were directly computed by averaging across all
retrieved item locations.

Bias Measurement. In order to measure the influence of gist on item memory, we
developed a bias measurement as follows. Since the error analysis revealed a decrease in
gist memory (i.e., reported center) after a month, there could be a difference in using
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reported center and using the true center of encoded items as bias center. We initially used
the reported center as the center for the bias analysis. However, we also computed a bias
using the center of encoded items to be consistent with common practices in ensemble
perception research (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Lew & Vul, 2015).
Observed Bias: The bias towards the center for each retrieved item was defined as the
relative difference in distance between a participant’s reported center and each landmark’s
encoded location versus each landmark’s retrieved location. This relative difference was
then divided by the error for that landmark:
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =

(𝑑(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑖𝑠𝑡) − 𝑑(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑖𝑠𝑡))
𝑑(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚)

where

d (a, b) = √(𝑎1 − 𝑏1 )2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑏2 )2 (Fig. 2.3b). Bias thus can range between -1 and 1
and bias > 0 indicates that item memory is biased towards the center while bias < 0 indicates
that the item is biased away from the center. Each participant’s bias not controlling for
error was computed as the average across the biases of the 6 landmarks.
Item-only simulation: The item-only simulation assumed that the magnitude of error for
each item memory would be the same as the corresponding item memory collected from
participants, but the direction of simulated recalled location would not be systematically
influenced by the gist. Following this assumption, we generated 1000 simulations for each
participant. Each simulation consisted of six simulated retrieved items, corresponding to
all the six landmark locations. For each location, we randomly generated a retrieved
location based on the participant’s true error for this specific location, allowing its angle
relative to the encoded location to vary randomly across the simulations (Fig. 2.7b; gray
cross). If a simulated location fell outside the boundaries of the screen, the algorithm
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generated a new location. The bias value for each of the 1000 simulations was the average
across each simulation’s six retrieved locations. The item-only simulated bias for each
participant was the average across the 1000 simulations.
Item-plus-gist simulation (abbreviated as gist simulation for simplicity): The gist
simulation assumed that the magnitude of error for each item memory would be the same
as the corresponding item memory collected from participants, but the reported center
systematically influences the probability of recalled locations (instead of the uniform
probability distribution around the item location in the “item-only simulation”). Following
this assumption, we generated 1000 simulations for each participant. Each simulation
consisted of six simulated retrieved items, corresponding to all the six encoded landmark
locations. For each encoded location, the simulated retrieved location is generated based
on not only the participant’s true error for this specific location, but also based on a
probability assigned according to the distance from that simulated location to the reported
center as follows (Fig. 2.7a). For any encoded location, the space where a simulated
retrieved location can possibly be generated is a circle centering the encoded location with
a radius of an error from participants’ error data. We divided the circle into 200 angles. At
each angle on that circle, we calculated the distance from that angle to the reported center
and assigned a probability to that angle based on such distance:
𝑃𝑖
=

∑𝑛𝑖=1

𝑑(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) − (𝑑(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟))
(𝑑(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑑(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟)))

where i corresponds to each angle and n corresponds to the total number of angles (200).
The probability for any location to be retrieved would thus be inverse to the distance
between the angle and the reported center. If a simulated location fell outside the
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boundaries of the screen, the algorithm generated a new location. The bias value for each
of the 1000 simulations was the average across each simulation’s six retrieved locations.
The gist simulated bias for each participant was the average across the 1000 simulations.
For both item-only simulations and gist simulations, when item memory error increases,
the increased error will lead to a negative bias value despite no meaningful bias away from
the center of the landmarks (Fig. 2.7c). Therefore, it is necessary to compare the data with
the simulations.
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Fig. 2.7. Illustration of the simulations. a) An example of the probability of simulated
locations to be generated for an encoded location given the same extent of error in gist
simulation. b) Items with large errors are more likely to have a negative absolute bias by
chance. First, the proportion of the arc with negative absolute bias in the circumference of
simulated items is higher for items with large error. Because the distance between any
points on the arc defined by the intersection between the green circle and red circle to the
center will be shorter than the red distance, the points will all have an absolute bias value
≥ 0 (indicated by orange X marks), whereas the points outside of the arc will have a
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negative bias (indicated by grey X marks). Second, even though the retrieved item (blue
triangle in the lower figure) with small error and the retrieved item with large error (blue
triangle in the upper figure) are biased in the same direction, the absolute bias for the
retrieved item with the small error is positive whereas the other is negative, which
demonstrates how a retrieved item with large error could cause negative bias without
meaningfully being biased away from the center relative to its encoded location. c)
Simulations based on the 6 encoded locations in Experiment 1 showed that random error
of retrievals not assuming direction was negatively correlated with bias for both item-only
simulation and gist simulation.

Statistics. To examine whether gist memory persisted when memory for items decayed
over time, we conducted a 3 (group: 24-hour, 1-week, and 1-month) X 2 (memory type:
item, center) aligned ranks transformation ANOVA, a nonparametric approach that allows
for analyzing main effects and interaction (Kay, M., 2020), of the error change (Session 2
error values - Session 1 error values) and also two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests for betweengroup error change comparisons, because the data were not normally distributed as
determined by a Shapiro-Wilk test. In order to examine whether there is a relation between
item and gist memory, we used a linear model to evaluate the effects of estimated center
error, delay group, and their interaction on reported center error. To interpret the effects of
the overall effect of the delay group on the gist error, rather than the individual effects of
each group, we reported the SSE rather than betas.
In order to examine whether the observed bias became more dissimilar to bias predicted
by the item-only simulation over time, we conducted a 2 (session: Session 1 vs. Session 2)
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x 3 (delay groups: 24 hours, 1 week, and 1 month) ANOVA in the difference between the
observed bias and item-only simulated bias (bias data - item-only simulated data). As
follow-up analyses, we used two-tailed paired t-tests to compare the difference in observed
bias and item-only simulated bias between session 1 and session 2 for each delay group. In
order to examine whether item retrievals were biased towards the center at any time points,
we compared the observed bias against the item-only simulated bias for each group at each
session.
In order to examine whether the observed bias became more similar to bias predicted by
the gist simulated bias, we conducted the same ANOVA in the difference between the
observed bias and gist simulated bias (gist simulated data - observed bias). As follow-up
analyses, we used two-tailed paired t-tests to compare the difference in observed bias and
gist simulated bias between session 1 and session 2 for each delay group. Note that due to
the limited number of trials, we could not fit the most accurate parameter of gist influence
and therefore the amount of gist influence under the gist simulation is arbitrary and likely
not accurately reflecting the amount of gist influence in observed data. Therefore, unlike
the analysis for item-only simulated bias, we did not predict that over time the observed
bias would become indistinguishable from the gist simulated bias and tested whether
observed bias and gist simulated bias significantly differed at all sessions for the delay
groups. Reports were not corrected for multiple comparisons.
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Follow-up Gist-based Bias Analyses.
Center of Encoded Locations as Bias Center: This analysis was exactly the same with
the bias analysis in the prior section, except that this analysis used the center of encoded
locations, instead of the center participants reported as bias center.
Weighted Center by Item Accuracy: This analysis was exactly the same with the bias
analysis in the prior section, except that this analysis used a center weighted by item
accuracy as bias center, instead of the center participants reported as bias center. The
weight of each item was determined by (1- error of the item/error of all items)/(number of
items - 1), such that items with higher accuracy would be weighted more in the computed
center and also that the weight of all items summed up to 1.
Minkowski’s Space: This analysis was exactly the same with the bias analysis in the
prior

section,

except

that

all

the

distance

was

computed

by

𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) =

1.5

√(𝑎1 − 𝑏1 )1.5 + (𝑎2 − 𝑏2 )1.5 . We selected 1.5 because Minkowski distance is defined
𝑔

by √(𝑎1 − 𝑏1 )𝑔 + (𝑎2 − 𝑏2 )𝑔 and g is typically selected between 1 and 2.

Swapped Items. In recalling the location for the landmarks, participants might “misbind”
the label of a landmark and its location (e.g., indicate the location of the “restaurant” at the
actual location for the “university” and vice versa). In order to test the potential influence
of such errors on our results, we developed a criterion to identify pairs of items that were
swapped, and we swapped them back to see if that changed the results. That is, for example,
if (1) the retrieval for “restaurant” was closest to the encoded location for “university”, (2)
the retrieval for “university” was closest to the encoded location for “restaurant”, (3) the
retrievals were both within the range of both of the encoded locations (i.e. the distance
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between encoded “restaurant” and “university” / 2) and, (4) there were no other retrievals
in this range, we then swapped the retrieved university and restaurant responses and used
the swapped results for the analyses described above. We found that swapping the items
did not change any of the reported results.

Experiment 2
Participants and procedure. We recruited 77 members of the University of Pennsylvania
community (18-30 years old; normal or corrected to normal vision) to participate in the
experiment for monetary compensation. Sample size was based on prior behavioral
memory studies 5 . All procedures were approved by University of Pennsylvania IRB
(IRB #705915, Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Functions of Frontal Cortex). All 77
participants received training and testing during Session 1 and reported item and center
memories again after 24 hours (Session 2). Sessions 1 and 2 were identical with Experiment
1, except that in Experiment 2 during Session 1, participants were trained to retrieve eight
landmark locations, one of which was a spatial outlier (see Experiment 2 stimuli in Fig.
2.1), until their retrieval error for each landmark was fewer than 50 pixels (again, a distance
less than ½ of the shortest distance between the pairs of encoded locations) in any direction.
In addition, in Session 1 of Experiment 2, to streamline the session, item memory was
derived from the item memory test in the last round of evaluation during training (Phase
3), which was immediately followed by the gist memory test (see Experiment 2 procedure

5

Because this was a new experiment, we were unable to identify an effect size from a past study
that was appropriate for a power analysis. Therefore, we tried to collect a sample equivalent to what
is commonly collected in behavioral memory studies (e.g., Schapiro et al., 2017) and continued to
recruit participants across two semesters.
51

in Fig. 2.1). The time for Session 1 was approximately 25 minutes, which was longer than
that for Experiment 1 because in Experiment 2, participants learned more locations and the
training criterion was harder (50 pixels, as opposed to 80 pixels in Experiment 1).
After 32 to 57 days, 50 participants returned for Session 3 by email invitation. Session
3 was identical to Session 2 (i.e., participants reported their memory for the center and then
each item). The time for Session 2 and 3 was approximately 10 minutes. Of the 50
participants who returned for the third session, 1 participant was excluded because their
individual and gist performance for at least one session was lower than 3 SD below average.
We did not exclude participants whose reported gist memory error was larger than the
distance between the screen center and the true center at Session 1, as in Experiment 1,
because in Experiment 2, a large gist error could be a meaningful result that reflects the
overweighting of the outlier in reporting gist. We excluded 6 participants who placed the
outlier where the majority of items were, which means the error of the outlier was larger
than 573 pixels (i.e., the distance between the center of screen and outlier encoded location).
The reason we excluded these participants was that in Experiment 2, if participants
swapped the outlier with one of the other items, or simply put the outlier among the other
items, this outlier swap would strongly inflate the bias value towards the global reported
center, which does not necessarily reflect a true bias towards the center. Our reported
results thus include 43 participants (age: M = 21.5, SD = 2.2, gender: 75% female)

Error measurement. All error measures were calculated as in Experiment 1, except that the
chance performance for individual items based on the center of the screen was 386 pixels
(determined by the average Euclidean distance between the center of the laptop screen and
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each encoded item location), chance performance for items based on center of encoded
locations was 262 pixels (determined by the average Euclidean distance between the center
of the encoded item locations and each encoded item location), and the chance performance
for gist memory was 223 pixels (determined by the average Euclidean distance between
the center of the laptop screen and the true center of all encoded item locations).

Bias Measurement. We calculated bias as in Experiment 1, except that we additionally
computed a local gist bias, which was a bias index using the local center (i.e., the center of
the seven encoded locations excluding the outlier) as the bias center.

Outlier weight estimation. In order to estimate the weight of the outlier on the reported gist
memory, we developed a weight model as follows: For each participant at each session, a
series of weights were applied to the encoded outlier location. The range of the weight of
the outlier was from 0 to 1, with a stepwise increment of 0.0125. The weight for each of
the other encoded items was assumed to be the same and would thus be (1 - outlier
weight)/number of items that were not the outlier, ranging from 0 to 0.125. Based on these
weights, 81 simulated centers were computed: when the outlier weight was 0, the simulated
center would be a perfect local center ignoring the outlier; when the outlier weight was
0.125, the simulated center would be a perfect global center of all items, since there were
8 items in total; when the outlier weight was 1, the simulated center would be the outlier
itself.
For each participant at each session, the Euclidean distance between each simulated
center and reported center was computed, resulting in 81 distances. We used the weight
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that resulted in the smallest distance as the estimated weight of the outlier for that
participant at that session.

Statistics. As in Experiment 1, we conducted a 2 (delay: short retention of 1 day or long
retention of 1-2 months) x 2 (memory type: item, center) aligned ranks transformation
ANOVA with repeated measures of error change (short, defined by Session 2 error values
- Session 1 error values, or long, defined by Session 3 error values - Session 1 error values)
and pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank tests for error comparisons, since change in error was
not normal as determined by a Shapiro-Wilk test.
As in Experiment 1, in order to examine whether there was a relation between item and
gist memory, we used a linear mixed effects model on reported center error with fixed
effects of delay (24 hours and 1 to 2 months), estimated center error, and their interaction,
as well as a random effect of participant.
As in Experiment 1, in order to examine whether the item retrievals were increasingly
biased towards the reported center over time, we conducted a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA in the difference between observed bias and item-only simulated bias across
sessions (after training, 24 hours, and 1 month). We compared the bias values against the
item-only simulated bias controlling for error against 0 at each session by paired t-tests to
examine whether item retrievals were significantly biased towards the reported center. We
conducted the analogous ANOVA analysis in the difference between observed bias and
gist simulated bias using reported center as bias center. As explained in the results, we then
conducted the same statistical analyses using the local center as the bias center and then
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follow-up paired t-tests between sessions. Reports were not multiple comparisons
corrected.
In order to examine whether the outlier was weighted more, the same, or less compared
to other items, we compared the outlier weight values against the weight assuming all items
to be equal (i.e., ⅛ = 0.125) with t-tests. In order to examine whether the weight of the
outlier in gist memory changed over time, we used a paired t-test comparing the outlier
weight change after a short retention interval (Session 2 outlier weight values - Session 1
outlier weight values) against the outlier weight change after a long retention interval
(Session 3 outlier weight values - Session 1 outlier weight values).

Data availability
All data will be available at
https://osf.io/jxme8/?view_only=049dcb1efaf44c3098040ba027f88115

Code availability
All scripts used to analyze the data will be available at
https://osf.io/jxme8/?view_only=049dcb1efaf44c3098040ba027f88115
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Figure 2.8. Error at each session in Experiment 1. Experiment 1 error in item and gist
(center) memory at Session 1 (a) and at Session 2 (b). * indicates p < .05, **** indicates
p < .0001, and ns indicates p > .05 by t-tests between groups and ANOVA (top left). Red
dashed lines indicate chance performance for item (defined as the average of distance
between encoded item locations and center of the screen) and gist memory (defined as the
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distance between the center of encoded locations and center of the screen) based on
center of the screen. Blue dashed lines indicate chance performance for item memory,
based on the center of encoded locations. This corresponds to what participants’
performance would be if they only remembered the center and just clicked the center
when asked to recall an item. The band indicates the median, the box indicates the first
and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points
indicate outliers.
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Figure 2.9. Experiment 1 error change between Session 1 and 2 in gist (center) memory,
estimated gist, and simulated estimated gist based on a simple item-only simulation,
assuming that the magnitude of error for each item memory would remain the same but
the direction of error would not be systematically influenced by the gist 6. Aligned rank
transformed ANOVA analysis with three gist memory error type revealed a main effect
of delay, F(2, 381) = 42.93, p < .001, memory type, F(2, 381) = 15.17, p < .001, and an
interaction between delay and memory type, F(4, 381) = 3.83, p < .01, suggesting that the
error increase over time is not the same for these gist memory types. For reported gist
error (Gr) and simulated estimated gist error (sGe), we found a significant interaction
between delay group and gist memory error type, F(2, 254) = 6.68, p = .001. For

6

We generated 1000 simulations for each participant. Each simulation consisted of all simulated retrieved
items, corresponding to all the landmark locations. For each location, we randomly generated a retrieved
location based on the participant’s true error for this specific location, allowing angle to vary randomly across
the simulations. Then, we computed the center for these locations to get the simulated estimated gist for each
simulated participant. The error for such simulated estimated gist was the Euclidean distance between the
true center and the simulated gist. The simulated estimated gist error for each real participant was the average
value of simulated estimated gist error for their corresponding 1000 simulated participants.
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estimated gist error (Ge) and simulated estimated gist error, we also found a significant
interaction between delay group and gist memory error type, F(2, 254) = 3.28, p = .039.
Gist error and estimated gist error both increased less over time compared to the
simulated estimated gist error under this simple item-only simulation over time,
suggesting that participants’ data are not compatible with this simple item-only
simulation. We did not find a significant interaction between Gr and Ge across time, F(2,
254) = 1.18, p = .31, consistent with the idea that Ge was calculated from item memories
influenced by the center after delay. **** indicates p < .0001 and ns indicates p > .05 by
ANOVA (top left). The band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third
quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate
outliers.
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Figure 2.10. Experiment 2 error in item and gist (center) memory at each session. Red
dashed lines indicate chance performance for item (defined as the average of distance
between encoded item locations and center of the screen) and gist memory (defined as the
distance between the center of encoded locations and center of the screen) based on center
of the screen. Blue dashed lines indicate chance performance for item memory, based on
the center of encoded locations. **** indicates p < .0001 by paired t-tests and ANOVA
(top left). The band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the
whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outliers. Dots and
lines indicate participants.
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Chapter 3: Item distinctiveness influences gist memory formation

Abstract
How do humans synthesize and aggregate across individual experiences to form
summary statistics? It remains unclear how the properties of the items, such as reward
motivation, influence how these items contribute to the gist. In two experiments, 500
participants encoded spatial locations that are emphasized with different sources of
distinctiveness (reward motivation, increased attention by a distinctive color, and
repeated exposure). After this training, participants reported their item memory (memory
of these locations) and their gist memory (memory of the center) for these locations.
Experiment 1 found that reward motivation increased the accuracy of the distinctive item
without changing the overall item and gist memory. Experiment 2 discovered that
increased attention by color and repeated exposure distorted gist memory in different
ways, while reward motivation preserved the gist memory. Our results demonstrate that
different sources of item distinctiveness influence gist memory formation and suggest a
protective role of reward motivation on gist memory.

Introduction
Human minds have the extraordinary ability to extract summary statistics from
observing and experiencing individual events and instances. For example, you probably
have seen many pies in your life, but when you are asked to think about an average pie,
something round and brownish may come to your mind. This ability to extract the
summary statistics, to “get the gist of it”, is important to our life. Following the example
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of pie, in order to decide whether you would like to eat a pie tonight, you probably need
to have a memory of the average pie. Given the importance of summary statistics, little is
known about how human minds synthesize and summarize these individual experiences
to form this memory of average. For instance, if the pies your grandmother makes always
give you sweetness and warmness, would the memory of these pies become more
memorable, and thus shape your memory of the average pie more than the other pies?
Much research has demonstrated that humans are excellent at extracting and retaining
the “gist memory”, the memory of summary statistics across individual instances, over
time (Graves et al., 2020; Lutz et al., 2017; Posner & Keele, 1970; Richards et al., 2014;
Zeng et al., 2017). However, not much research has examined how the individual items
contribute to the gist, and particularly the factors that may influence such contributions in
long-term memory.
Ensemble perception work has provided evidence that not all items contribute to the
gist equally in working memory (Alvarez, 2011; Whitney & Leib, 2018). This line of
research usually operationalizes item memories as item properties on a continuous
dimension such as the size of individual circles and gist memories as the average of the
property such as the average size of the group of circles (Brady & Alvarez, 2011). They
show that distinctive items, such as items that received more attention or items that are
deviant from other items, disproportionately influenced the gist. For example, emotional
faces with more attention contribute more to the average emotional faces that participants
recalled (Ying, 2022). Expressions that are deviant from other expressions are discarded
in memory of the average expressions (Haberman & Whitney, 2010).
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A few long-term memory studies have also suggested a disproportionate influence of
distinctive items on the gist memory. “Outlier” items, which are spatial locations that are
far from other locations, greatly distorted the memory of the summary statistics across
these spatial locations for both rodents and humans (Richards et al., 2014; Zeng et al.,
2021). These studies offered paradigms that can measure the contribution of items to the
gist in long-term memory. Through operationalizing item memory as the memory of
spatial locations on a computer screen and gist memory as the memory of the center of
these spatial locations, the values of the weight of these items in the gist can be estimated
or calculated from participants’ retrieved memory (Zeng et al., 2021), similar to working
memory literature (Haberman & Whitney, 2010). These paradigms provide a start for us
to understand the factors that influence how each item contributes to the gist in the longterm memory.
It will be particularly meaningful to investigate reward motivation as a source of
distinctiveness. Work in motivational learning has demonstrated that emphasizing items
with reward motivation during learning on items improves the memory of these items
(Cowan et al., 2021; Shigemune et al, 2014). Nevertheless, less is understood about how
this reward motivation influences the extraction of gist memory across these items.
Reward motivation on items may change the gist memory formation. Neuroimaging work
shows that reward during learning facilitated the coupling between the hippocampus and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Murty et al., 2016). Interestingly, this coupling
between hippocampus and vmPFC is associated with gist memory extraction (Tse et al.,
2007; Zeithamova et al., 2012).
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The recruitment of a similar neural network may lead to an influence of reward
motivation on the formation of gist memory at the behavioral level. It is unclear how.
Reward motivation of items may improve the accuracy of gist memory by facilitating the
neural network of gist extraction. On the other hand, the reward may impair the accuracy
of gist memory by utilizing the same resources of the neural network.
Moreover, reward motivation may influence the gist by altering the contribution of the
emphasized item to the gist memory. It is possible that reward will increase the weight of
items in the gist by increasing the attention or the accuracy of these items (Yang, 2022).
Alternatively, reward motivation may decrease the weight of the emphasized item
because reward may make the emphasized item different from the other items, and thus
separate that emphasized item from being incorporated into the gist (Haberman &
Whitney, 2010). A third possibility is that items emphasized with reward may contribute
to the gist to the same level as other items because reward protects the gist memory from
being distorted by the increased distinctiveness of some items (Clewett & Murty, 2019).
The current study intended to disentangle these possibilities. In Experiment 1, we
trained participants to learn two sets of spatial locations. One set of locations contained
an item that was associated with monetary reward during training (the reward condition)
and the other set of locations did not (the neutral condition). We contrasted participants’
memory of the spatial locations as well as their memory of the center of these locations
between these two conditions in order to understand the influence of reward motivation
on gist memory extraction. To explore the influence of reward motivation on the
contribution of the items to the gist, we computed the weight values of the reward item in
the gist memory.
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In Experiment 2, we aimed to separate the influence of the reward from that of
increased attention and accuracy. We contrasted the item memory, gist memory, and the
weight values of the distinctive item in the gist in the reward condition with not only
these memories in the neutral condition, but also these memories in an attention condition
where an item was emphasized with increased attention, and in a frequency condition
where an item was emphasized with repeated exposure. Taken together, these
experiments provide insights into how different sources of distinctiveness, especially
reward motivation, influence the extraction of summary statistics from individual
experiences.

Results
Experiment 1
66 participants completed the experiment in the lab (age: M = 19.5, SD = 6.7, gender:
79% females). In Experiment 1, item memories were operationalized as two categories of
locations on a laptop screen, six ‘landmarks’ and six ‘animals’ (i.e. dots associated with
unique names of landmarks and animals) (Figure 3.1b). Participants learned these
categories of locations through training (Figure 3.1; see Methods for details. The reward
and neutral conditions only differed in the training of a particular item: in the reward
condition, participants were instructed that remembering one specific item during the
training would work towards earning monetary bonuses, and the item name would be
marked with signs of “$” during training, whereas in the neutral condition, all the items
were learned in the same way with no monetary bonuses.
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After the training, participants were instructed that all the parts associated with
monetary bonuses had ended, but they were still encouraged to do their best in the task.
They were only able to proceed after they solved 10 arithmetic questions, which was
intended to minimize the influence of working memory. Finally, they were tested on item
and gist memory for each condition. During the gist memory test, participants reported
their memory of the center (average location) of a category. During the item memory test,
they recalled each item location in random order with no feedback. The order of reward
and neutral conditions corresponded to the order of them during the training phase.
Through the experiments, we collected participants’ memory of the items and their
memory of the gist.
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Fig. 3.1. Procedure and stimuli for Experiment 1. (a) An example of the procedure. The
order of reward condition and neutral condition and the order of item and gist tests within
each condition were both randomized across participants. (b) An illustration of the
location of the stimuli (drawn to scale). The circles in solid lines indicate the locations
participants learned. The circle in dashed lines indicates the center of each
category/condition of locations. The assignment between category and the cluster of
locations and the assignment between category and condition are randomized across
participants.

The reward and the neutral condition did not differ in overall gist and item error, but the
reward item had higher accuracy
Our analyses did not find any significant differences between the reward condition and
the neutral condition in their overall item memory error (Figure 3.2a; Figure 3.2c) and
gist memory error (Figure 3.2a; Figure 3.2b), Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: ps > 0.17. The
error of the reward item in the reward condition was significantly lower compared to that
of the neutral item in the reward condition, Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Z = 5.47, p <
0.0001, and also that of the items in the neutral condition, Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Z =
4.88, p < 0.0001 (Figure 3.2d). The difference between the neutral items in the reward
and the neutral condition was not significant, Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Z = 1.91, p =
0.06. These results suggest that the reward on an item successfully increased the accuracy
of that particular item, but did not change the overall accuracy of the item and gist
memory.
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To demonstrate the relation between item and gist memory that was detected in prior
studies (Zeng et al., 2021), we used a linear model to evaluate the effects of item memory
error and the condition on reported center error. We found that item memory error
significantly predicted gist memory error, SSE = 4502.6, F(1, 108) = 6.75, p = 0.01. The
interaction between the item memory error and condition on reported center error was not
significant SSE = 929.4, F(1, 108) = 1.39, p = 0.24. These results indicate a positive
relationship between the item and gist memory for both the reward and the neutral
condition.
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Fig. 3.2. The error of participants’ item and gist memory. (a) Error measurements. (b)
Participants’ gist memory error by condition. Red dashed lines indicate chance
performance for gist memory (defined as the distance between the center of encoded
locations and the center of the screen). (c) Participants’ item memory error by condition.
(d) Participants’ item memory by the type of the item. *** indicates p < 0.001, ****
indicates p < 0.0001, and ns indicates p > 0.05 by paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
between conditions (b and c) and between item type (d). For c and d, red dashed lines
indicate chance performance for item memory (defined as the average distance between
encoded item locations and the center of the screen). This corresponds to what
participants’ performance would be if they clicked the screen center whenever asked to
recall an item. The band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third
quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate
outliers.

The reward item did not contribute more or less to gist memory
In order to examine how the reward on an item will influence its contribution to the
gist memory, we computed the weight values of the reward items. This computation was
adapted from weighted models in prior work on working memory and long-term memory
(Haberman and Whitney, 2010; Zeng et al., 2021; see Methods for details). The weight of
the reward item was marginally lower than 0.167 (i.e., ⅙, the level assuming equal
weights across all items), Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: Z = 1.83, p = 0.07, (Figure 3.3). It
can be concluded that the reward item did not contribute more to the gist memory
compared to other items.
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Fig. 3.3. The weights of the reward item in the gist memory. The red dashed line
indicates the chance level when the weight of the reward item when equal to the weight
of other items in the gist memory. The band indicates the median, the box indicates the
first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid
points indicate outliers). Greater values indicate higher weights of the reward item in the
gist memory.

In order to understand whether the accuracy of the reward item influences the weights,
we computed the correlation between the weight and the accuracy of the reward item. We
did not find a significant correlation (p = 0.31). There is no evidence from Experiment
1’s data for an influence of item accuracy on its weight to the gist memory. Taken
together, results from Experiment 1 suggest that the reward motivation on an item
increased the accuracy of that item, but did not influence the overall item and gist
memory.
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Experiment 2
To further understand how the distinctiveness of items influences the gist memory, we
conducted Experiment 2. The training procedure and stimuli of Experiment 2 (Figure 3.4;
see Methods for more details) were similar to those of Experiment 1 (Figure 3.1).
However, the two experiments differed in three major aspects (see Methods for more
details). First, in order to further understand the role of reward on the gist memory, we
conducted two additional distinctiveness conditions to contrast with the reward: the
attention condition and the frequency condition (Figure 3.4), to control for the influence
of attention and accuracy. The four conditions were the same except for one critical
difference: how one of the six items is emphasized. The reward condition emphasized
one item with a monetary bonus of $3 that will double the payment; the frequency
condition emphasized one item with repeated training; the attention condition emphasized
one item with the color red, utilizing the Von Restorff effect to increase attention on this
item (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2017); the neutral condition did not emphasize any items, but
had one foil item which matched exactly with the emphasized items in other controls. We
assigned each participant a stimuli ID, through which we can identify the stimuli they get
and match across conditions. Second, Experiment 2 had an across-participants design,
where each participant only experienced one condition and learned one set of six
locations. This was to avoid any influence between the two clusters of locations. Third, in
Experiment 1, it was unclear whether there was any noise caused by the stimuli that
would impact the weight of the emphasized item in any particular way. In order to control
for this possible noise and enable direct comparisons across all the conditions,
Experiment 2 deployed a “yolked” design, where each participant in each of the
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conditions received exactly the same stimuli as what corresponding participants in other
conditions would receive, including the location-name mapping, the presentation order of
the locations in each round, the order of the item and the gist test, which item was
selected to be emphasized, etc. After the training, participants reported their gist and item
memory, with the test order varied across participants, similar to Experiment 1.
Our reported results thus included 422 participants who completed the task on
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four
conditions: reward, frequency, neutral, and attention (Figure 3.4). Our reported results
include 422 participants, with 112 participants in the reward condition, 102 participants
in the repeat condition, 108 participants in the attention condition, and 100 participants in
the neutral condition.
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Fig. 3.4. Procedure and stimuli for Experiment 2. (a) Training procedure for the four
conditions. The arithmetic questions and the test phase are similar to Experiment 1 and
thus are omitted here. (b) An illustration of the location of the stimuli (drawn to scale).
The circles in solid lines indicate the locations participants learned. The circle in dashed
lines indicates the center of each category/condition of locations.
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Fig. 3.5. Errors and weight values by condition. (a) Participants’ item memory error by
condition. Dashed lines indicate chance performance defined as the average distance
between each encoded item location and the center of the screen. Dotted lines indicate the
chance performance defined as the average distance between each encoded item location
and the center of these encoded locations. (b) The difference between the error in the
neutral items and the emphasized item. A larger difference indicates higher accuracy for
the emphasized items compared to the neutral items. (c) Participants’ gist memory error
by condition. Red dashed lines indicate chance performance for gist memory (defined as
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the distance between the center of encoded locations and the center of the screen). (d)
The weights of the reward item in the gist memory by conditions. The red dashed line
indicates the chance level where the weight of the reward item is the same as that of other
items in the gist memory. Greater values indicate higher weights of the reward item in the
gist memory. For all figures, *** indicates p < 0.001, **** indicates p < 0.0001, .
indicates p = 0.08, and ns indicates p > 0.05 for a main effect of condition between each
pair as well as all conditions together (top left) by linear mixed-effects models controlling
for stimuli. The band indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles,
the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outliers.

Sources of distinctiveness did not change overall item accuracy but increased the
accuracy of the emphasized item at different levels
In order to understand the influence of distinctiveness on the item memory (see
Methods for details of how it is calculated), we conducted a linear mixed-effects model
on overall item memory error (Figure 3.5a) with fixed effects of conditions (reward,
attention, frequency, and neutral) and a random effect of stimuli ID to account for the
noise from the stimuli. The main effect of condition, SSE = 1532, F(3, 418) = 0.21, p =
0.89, which suggests that the four conditions matched in their overall item memory error.
However, all the distinctive items (reward, attention, and frequency) had higher
accuracy compared to the neutral items, which was shown by the following statistical
analyses. We computed the difference between the neutral item error and the distinctive
item error for each condition. The difference scores for the three distinctiveness
conditions were all higher than 0 (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: ps < .001), but the
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difference score for the neutral conditions was not significantly different from 0 (p =
0.17). These results suggested that all the distinctiveness manipulation successfully
increased the accuracy of the distinctive items.
In addition, we conducted a linear mixed-effects model on this difference score with
fixed effects of conditions (reward, attention, frequency, and neutral) with a random
effect of stimuli ID to account for the noise from the stimuli. We found a significant
effect of condition, SSE = 123954, F(3, 418) = 12.12, p < 0.001 (Figure 3.5b). We then
conducted the same fixed effects models on the difference scores for pairwise
comparisons between conditions to further understand the source of the variation. In
particular, the reward and repeat condition did not significantly differ in the difference
scores, SSE = 6003.2, F(1, 160.34) = 2.12, p = 0.15, but all the other pairwise
comparisons between conditions were significant, ps < 0.04 (Figure 3.5b). All the
distinctiveness conditions had higher difference scores compared to the neutral conditions
(ps < 0.04). These results suggested that the different types of distinctiveness did not
influence the overall item memory, but increased the distinctive item accuracy to various
extent.

Attention, but not reward and frequency, on the distinctive item impaired the accuracy of
overall gist memory
In order to understand how the different sources of distinctiveness influence the gist
memory, we conducted a linear mixed-effects model on the reported center error with
fixed effects of conditions (reward, attention, frequency, and neutral) with a random
effect of stimuli ID to account for the noise from the stimuli. We found a significant
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effect of condition, SSE = 10779, F(3, 368.79) = 2.93, p = 0.03, which suggests that the
four conditions differed in their gist memory error, despite the similarity of overall item
memory across these conditions. In order to further understand the source of the main
effect and separate the influence of reward, we compared pairs of these conditions
separately with similar linear mixed-effects models. We found a significant difference
between attention and neutral condition, SSE = 8528.5, F(1, 206) = 6.17, p = 0.01, and a
significant difference between attention and frequency condition, SSE = 7889.8, F(1,
208) = 5.87, p = 0.02. These results suggested that only attention to particular items
changed the overall gist memory error.

Frequency, but not reward and attention, increased the weights of the distinctive item in
gist memory
To understand how sources of the distinctiveness of items influence the items’
contribution to the gist memory, we computed the weights of the distinctive items in the
gist memory for all four conditions (Figure 3.5d; see Methods for details) and compared
these weights to chance level, ⅙, which was defined by what the weight of the distinctive
item would be if it were the same with all the other neutral items. Only the weight in the
frequency condition was significantly higher than the chance level (Z = 2.57, p = 0.01).
This result suggests that the repeated exposure of a particular item during learning
increased its contribution to the gist memory. Despite similar increased accuracy in the
distinctive items, the rewarded item and the attention item both did not contribute to the
gist memory as the repeatedly exposed item did (ps > 0.60).
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In order to account for the possible noise from the stimuli, we conducted a linear
mixed-effects model on weights of the distinctive item with fixed effects of conditions
(reward, attention, frequency, and neutral) with a random effect of stimuli ID. The main
effect of the condition was only marginally significant, SSE = 1.11, F(3, 418) = 2.21, p =
0.09. However, the weight of the distinctive item in the frequency condition was still
higher than that of the neutral condition, SSE = 1.04, F(1, 200) = 5.24, p = 0.02. These
results suggested that despite similar accuracy of the distinctive item, repeated exposure,
but not reward, increased the weight of the distinctive item in the gist memory.
Taken together, results from Experiment 2 showed that increased attention, repeated
exposure, and reward on an item all do not influence overall item memory accuracy, but
strengthen the accuracy of the distinctive items. Despite having similar accuracy on item
memory with reward, attention on an item impaired the gist memory accuracy compared
to the neutral condition. Repeated exposure, as opposed to reward, increased the weight
of the distinctive item in the gist memory, despite similar accuracy of this distinctive item
between the conditions. Results suggest that the reward may serve a protective role to
prevent the gist memory from being distorted.

Discussion
With two behavioral experiments with more than 500 participants, we examined how
humans extract generalities across individual items and how sources of the
distinctiveness of items influence the extraction of gist memory. We emphsized an item
with different sources of distinctiveness: reward, attention, and repeated exposure. We
tested the influence of the distinctiveness on item memory, gist memory, and how the
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items contribute to the gist. Across the two experiments, we found that the distinctiveness
of the items did not influence the overall item accuracy, although they increased the
accuracy of the emphasized items. We found that both increased attention and exposure
distorted the gist memory by either impairing the accuracy of the gist or shifting the
weights of the emphasized item in the gist memory. In contrast, we did not find such
effects for the reward condition. Our results highlight the different influences of the
distinctive items on the extraction of gist memory and suggest a possible protective role
of reward on gist memory.
We systematically manipulated memory of items with different sources of
distinctiveness: reward, attention, and repeated exposure. We found that repeated
exposure led to an increased weight of items in the gist. Although the item with reward
and the item with repeated exposure shared the same level of accuracy, the reward item
did not produce a higher weight on the items. If an increased accuracy of a emphasized
item would lead to an increased weight for the item, then the existence of a reward may
prevent this distortion by balancing and integrating the items in forming the gist memory.
It may be argued that the attention also increased the accuracy of the emphasized items
without increasing the weight of the items. However, the manipulation of attention did
not increase the accuracy of the emphasized item to the same level as our reward and
frequency condition (Figure 3.5b; Figure 3.9), and thus cannot provide a direct
comparison for the weight. Future research can explore different ways of attention
manipulation that reach the same level of accuracy as the reward and frequency
conditions. On the other hand, although our attention manipulation resulted in the same
level of overall item memory accuracy as other conditions, it worsened the gist memory
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accuracy. The attention manipulation with a different color may disrupt the integration of
items into the gist memory by separating them from other items or by allocating too
much resource to an item and sacrificing the global processing of the items. This result
adds to the limited evidence that increased attention can sometimes impair memory (Fu et
al., 2021), and provide evidence for the interaction between memory and attention (Chun
& Turk-Browne, 2007).
Our results show that different sources of distinctiveness on items influence the
formation of gist memory differently and imply a protective role of reward on gist
memory extraction which prevents the gist memory from being distorted. It is unclear
whether the results are specific to the nature of our stimuli and procedure. For instance,
the increased weight of the item of repeated exposure may be because repeated exposure
increased the temporal frequency of the emphasized item in the visual system and thus
registered this item into the gist uniquely. More work can be done to manipulate the
accuracy by reinforcing the items with other sources of distinctiveness and disentangling
the difference between frequency and accuracy. As another example, our experiments
manipulated attention with the distinctiveness of color, and it is possible that other
sources of perceptual and conceptual distinctiveness (e.g., the emphasized item can be
told to be “dangerous”) (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2017). Furthermore, it would be interesting
to contrast our results with another source of motivation - threat. It was shown that
reward and threat motivations recruit separate neural networks (Murty et al., 2016), and it
is unclear how this difference will manifest in gist memory formation. Further research
can be done to broaden the generalizability of the finding by investigating other sources
of distinctiveness. We believe our findings provide a start for a promising research
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endeavor to understand how different sources of distinctiveness will influence the
integration of items to form the memory of generalities.
Our work established that not all items weigh equally in long-term memory. Prior
literature has shown an enhancement of item memory associated with reward motivation
after a delay (Patil et al., 2017). Relating this line of work to our paradigms and providing
evidence on how the weights of items may change in memory consolidation after sleep
and delay will contribute to the theories of memory consolidation. Our findings of
differential weights in long-term memory also have potential implications for other fields
of psychology, such as social stereotypes. We demonstrated that repeated exposure to a
particular item increased its weight in the gist memory in the lab. Will this finding be
able to be generalized to stereotype formation? For example, will repeated exposure to an
instance in a particular social category (e.g., gender and race) on social media shape the
stereotype of the social category more? Integration of theories and methods of the
cognitive mechanism of differential weighing into social categories will offer rich
resources for understanding social stereotype formation.
In summary, our work has demonstrated that not all items contribute to the gist equally
in long-term memory, and sources of distinctiveness influence the formation of the gist.
Our findings point to a disruptive role of attention and repeated exposure to gist memory
formation and a potentially protective role from reward motivation. These findings
provide insights into how humans extract summary statistics from individual experiences
in long-term memory.
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Methods
Experiment 1
Participants. In Experiment 1, we recruited 66 members of the University of
Pennsylvania community (18–30 years old; normal or corrected to normal vision) to
participate in the experiment for monetary compensation and course credit. The sample
size was determined based on prior literature that reported an increased weight of
particular items (Zeng et al., 2021). We excluded 8 participants because of low
performance in gist memory (i.e. reported center error was larger than chance
performance, defined by the distance between the center of the screen center and the
center of the encoded items) and because of individual, gist performance, and the weight
of the emphasized item out of 3 SD below or above average. Our reported results thus
include 58 participants. All procedures were approved by the University of Pennsylvania
IRB.

Stimuli and Procedure. Figure 3.1b illustrates the spatial locations of Experiment 1. The
experimental procedure is displayed in Figure 3.1a. Each category (landmark of animal)
was associated with a condition (reward or neutral). During the experiment, all
participants completed two phases, training and testing. Each phase contained two cycles,
a cycle for reward and another cycle for the neutral condition, with the order of the
conditions randomized across participants. During the training phase, each cycle
consisted of three rounds of training, where participants were trained to retrieve six
locations of a category consecutively on a laptop. Each round of training consisted of two
tasks, exposure and recall with feedback. In the exposure task, the locations appeared on
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the screen one at a time, and participants clicked on each location in order to proceed.
Consistent with prior studies using a similar paradigm (Zeng et al, 2021), on each trial,
only one location was presented (never the full map), and the center of the encoded
locations was never presented to participants. The instructions and the name of the
locations were always displayed under the box of the locations to prevent possible
influence on the memory of the locations. Figure 3.6 is a visual illustration of the
exposure task.

Fig. 3.6. Snapshot of the exposure task.

In the recall-with-feedback task, we asked participants to recall each location of a
category by clicking on the screen when given its name as a cue, and feedback about their
recall would be displayed: participants had one attempt to retrieve each location. If the
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distance between the encoded location and recalled location satisfied the learning
criterion (i.e. 60 pixels, which was defined by the minimum of the Euclidean distances
between the pairs of the spatial locations), a message that their recall was correct would
be prompted and the correct location would be displayed on the screen; otherwise, a
message that their recall was incorrect would be prompted and the correct location would
still be displayed on the screen.
The training of reward and the neutral cycle were identical except that in the reward
cycle, the instruction explicitly said that remembering one item in the recall with
feedback phase would work towards earning a bonus of $5 (which would double the
payment for the experiment). Importantly, the appearance of this item was associated
with signs of “$”. The emphasized item was randomly chosen among the six items for
each participant.
After participants completed the training phase of two cycles, they would be explicitly
instructed that all the parts with monetary bonus were finished (this was intended to
separate the influence of reward during encoding and recalling), but they were still
encouraged to do their best in the next tasks. Participants then completed 10 unrelated
arithmetic problems, which were designed to minimize potential influences from working
memory. Finally, participants were tested on their gist and item memory, or in the reverse
order. For the test of gist memory, they indicated their guess about the center of each
category (e.g., ‘Indicate the center (average location) of the landmarks you learned’). For
the test of item memory, participants separately retrieved each location of the categories.
The order of items was randomized in the tasks described above. All trials were selfpaced. The total time for the experiment was approximately 10 min.
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Error Measurement. We measured the accuracy for item memory (memory for each
spatial location) and gist memory (reported center for each category of locations) as
follows.
Item Memory Error (Dashed lines in Figure 3.2a): The error for each item was defined as
the Euclidean distance between each retrieved location and its encoded location, where d
(a, b) = sqrt((a1-b1)^2+(a2-b2)^2). Each participant’s item memory error in each
condition was computed as the average error for the six locations within each category.
Chance performance based on the center of the encoded items was 133 pixels, which was
determined by the average Euclidean distance between the center of encoded item
locations and each encoded item location within each category. We average across the
conditions. This distance corresponded to what participants’ performance would be if
they only remembered the center of item locations within each category and just clicked
that category center when asked to recall any item.

Gist Memory Error (Solid lines in Figure 3.2a): The error for gist memory of each
category/condition was defined as the reported center error, which was the Euclidean
distance between the participant’s reported center and the true center of all the encoded
items for each category/condition. Chance performance was 249 pixels, which was the
Euclidean distance between the center of the laptop screen and the true center of all
encoded locations for each category/condition. We averaged across two conditions to get
249 pixels. This distance corresponded to what participants’ performance would be if
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they just clicked the center of the screen when asked to report the center for each
category.

Weight Measurement. We computed the weight of the emphasized item on the gist
memory as follows (Figure 3.7): For each condition, we projected the center participants
reported on the connected line between the emphasized item participants reported and the
average (center) of the reported neutral items with no reinforcement within the same
category. The weight was then computed as the vector between the projected reported
center and the average neutral items divided by the vector between the reported
emphasized item and the average neutral items. Therefore, a higher weight value of an
item indicates a higher contribution to the gist memory from that item. The value can
range from negative to positive. When the value was ⅙, the item would contribute to the
gist equally as other items, as the number of items within a category is 6.
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Fig. 3.7. Illustration of the weight computation. Red indicates when the distinctive item
weighs less than other items and blue indicates when the distinctive item weights more
than other items.

Statistics. To understand whether the item and gist memory varied between the neutral
and the reward condition, we conducted paired t-tests between the two conditions for
both the gist and item memory individually. To establish that participants were sensitive
to the reward reinforcement, we used a linear mixed-effects model on item memory error
with fixed effects of the type of the items (reward items in the reward conditions, neutral
items in the reward conditions, and neutral items in the neutral conditions) with a random
effect of the participant. In order to test whether there was a relation between item and
gist memory, we used a linear mixed-effects model on gist memory error with fixed
effects of item memory, the condition (reward vs. neutral), and their interaction, as well
as a random effect of the participant ID. Finally, to examine whether the item with
reward contributed more, the same, or less to the gist memory compared to other items,
we compared their weight values against the weight assuming all items to be equal (i.e.
⅙ ) with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, because the weight values were not normally
distributed as determined by a Shapiro-Wilk test.

Experiment 2
Participants and stimuli. In Experiment 2, we recruited 712 participants through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (located in the U.S.; HIT Approval Rate > 97%) for
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monetary compensation. We conducted the experiment on MTurk to accelerate the data
collection. The sample size was calculated based on the weight of Experiment 1,
assuming α = .05 and β = 0.2, which resulted in 84 participants per condition.
We thus generated 100 sets of stimuli for the yolked design with matching stimuli
across groups. After participants signed up, we messaged them with an assigned ID and
condition which they were required to enter at the beginning of the HIT. Through this
information each participant entered, the program of the experiment generated the
corresponding stimuli and procedures for them. Each set of stimuli contained six
locations associated with landmark names (Figure 3.4b).
We excluded participants if they had low performance in gist memory (i.e. reported
center error was worse than all of the participants in Experiment 1 and also larger than
the distance between the center of the screen center and the center of the encoded items)
and because of individual, gist performance, and the weight of the emphasized item out
of 3 SD below or above average. We continued to collect data until we have around 100
participants per condition. Our reported results thus include 422 participants, with 112
participants in the reward condition (age: M = 37, SD = 10, gender: 42% Females), 102
participants in the repeat condition (age: M = 38, SD = 12, gender: 43% females), 108
participants in the attention condition (age: M = 36, SD = 12, gender: 57% females), and
100 participants in the neutral condition (age: M = 40, SD = 12, gender: 46% females).
When we had a more relaxed exclusion criterion which does not exclude participants
with gist performance worse than that in Experiment 1, we had 600 participants and the
pattern of the results was the same. All procedures were approved by the University of
Pennsylvania IRB.
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Procedure. The training procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment
1 except that participants only experienced one condition with six locations (Figure 3.4)
and also that there were two additional conditions, the attention condition, and the
frequency condition, as described in the results section. In the reward condition,
participants were told that remembering one particular item would work toward earning a
monetary bonus. During training, the name of this item would have signs of “$”. In the
attention condition, participants were told that one item would be in a different color.
During training, the location of that item would be displayed in red (Figure 3.8). In the
repeated exposure condition, participants were told that one item would be associated
with more training. During training, that item would appear four more times compared to
other items in each task. In the neutral condition, no items were emphasized, but because
the stimuli matched across groups, there would be one corresponding foil item that we
could compare the emphasized item with.
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Fig. 3.8. Snapshot of the exposure task in the attention condition.

Error Measurement, Weight Measurement, and Statistics. The measurements for
item memory error, gist memory error, and weight values are the same with Experiment
1. The statistics were thoroughly described in the main texts.

Supplementary Materials
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Fig 3.9. The error of participants’ memory in the emphasized items and the neutral items
by condition. Dashed lines indicate chance performance defined as the average distance
between each encoded item location and the center of the screen. Dotted lines indicate the
chance performance defined as the average distance between each encoded item location
and the center of these encoded locations. For all figures, * indicates p < 0.05, ***
indicates p < 0.001, and ns indicates p > 0.05 for the main effect of conditions between
each pair of conditions by linear mixed-effects models controlling for stimuli. The band
indicates the median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate
± 1.5 × interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outlier
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Chapter 4: Negative memory bias in COVID-19 pandemic
Abstract
How might humans summarize their emotions of an experience that took place over an
extended period of time? Would they differentially weigh the first day, the last day, the
most typical day, or the most extreme day to evaluate the experience? It seems
counterintuitive to think that someone would weigh an atypical day more. However,
some research shows that the atypical moments (i.e. peaks) contribute uniquely to the
estimation of the overall experience. In this study, 160 MTurk participants rated their
daily emotions (e.g. happiness, stress, shock, anger) throughout the first two months of
the COVID-19 pandemic. One week and one month later, participants recalled their
average emotions over that two-months period as well as the date-specific emotions
during these two months. We found a negative bias in both memories of the average
emotions and memories of date-specific emotions. The recalled average emotions were
more negative compared to the true average of the emotions. Moreover, the peak of
negative emotions uniquely predicts this recalled average after controlling for other
possible factors, such as the true average of these daily emotions. On the other hand, the
recall of date-specific emotions was more negative than the actual date-specific emotions,
but this negative bias decreased over time. We did not find the same effects for positive
emotions. These findings provide new insights into the extraction of summary statistics in
memory and emotion.
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Introduction

Our memory of events is formed from moment-to-moment transient states of these
events. For example, you probably remember how sad you were the day when your city
locked down, and you probably remember how sad you were in general during the
COVID-19 pandemic. How might humans summarize their emotions of an experience
that took place over an extended period of time? Humans’ ability to extract summary
statistics from observing individual events has been widely examined in various fields of
cognitive science, such as memory, perception, and concept formation. However, there is
not enough evidence for the mechanism of summary statistics extraction in the memory
of emotions.
Perception and memory literature shows that deviant instances disproportionally
contribute to the summary statistics across these items. Long-term memory research
shows that the extreme items may distort the memory of summary statistics more
compared to other items (Richards et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2021). It is unclear whether
the cognitive principles in spatial memory apply to the domain of emotions, that is,
whether the extreme emotions contribute more to the summary statistics of emotions in
long-term memory.
Literature on the peak-end rule sheds light on this question by showing that the “peak”
(i.e., the moment with the highest intensity) and the “end” of an experience, contribute to
people’s overall experience more than other factors such as the length of the experience
(Ariely & Carmon, 2000). However, findings from this line of work are mostly from lab
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993). There is not much research investigating how
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individual experiences of emotions contribute to the overall emotion in real life for an
extended period of time. Moreover, the existing work that examines the effect of peak in
real life with events spanning more than 1 week focuses on the evaluation of hedonic
experiences, with the results being mixed. While some studies found evidence for peak
predicting overall hedonic evaluation for a seven-day holiday at short delays but not long
delays (Geng et al., 2013), other studies did not find the peak or trough (the lowest
points) to be good predictors for overall hedonic evaluation for a 32-day winter holiday
or events in high school (Kemp et al., 2008; Kemp et al., 2012).
In addition, little is known about whether there may be a difference between positive
and negative emotions in the contribution of peak to the overall emotions in long-term
memory. Prior literature on perception shows positive emotions facilitate global
processing while negative emotions facilitate local processing in summary statistics
extraction (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Peng et al., 2022). However, there is not much
evidence for this difference in long-term memory, possibly because of a lack of
opportunity to measure and compare the two within the same context.
These findings point to a gap in the current literature about how extreme emotions
contribute to the evaluation of the summary statistics of the emotions in long-term
memory. Will the memory of overall emotions be distorted toward the peak, that is, the
extreme emotions, over a long extended period of time? Does this peak effect vary by
evaluation of positive and negative emotions? It will be important to examine this effect
after controlling for other factors of the daily emotions, such as the true average, the first
day, the last day, and participants’ current emotions.
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Moreover, the peak effect may lead to certain biases in memory. For example, if the
worst moment during the COVID-19 pandemic contributes more to our memory of
average sadness, then our recalled average sadness may be even more negative compared
to the true average of our daily sadness. Alternatively, if the best moment during the
pandemic contributes more to our memory of average sadness, then our recalled average
sadness may be less negative compared to the true average of our daily sadness. Prior
research on emotion memory biases provides mixed results. Some studies found positive
biases and some found negative biases (Adler & Pansky, 2020; Baumeister et al., 2001).
A possible explanation for the discrepancy is that the effect of emotions on memory
varies over time. For the purpose of survival, humans need to remember negative events
well in the short term to make sure they can deal with the negative events in time in order
to survive. However, for the purpose of maintaining well-being and protecting their
mental health, humans will need to prioritize positive information in the long term (Adler
& Pansky, 2020). Moreover, the existing studies focus on the recall of individual events
rather than the recall of summary statistics. It will be useful to seek evidence for the
change of emotional memory bias over time for both the memory of summary statistics
and the memory of individual events. In order to understand the possible change of
positive and negative bias over time, we collected participants’ recall of summary
statistics and date-specific emotions at a delay of one week and one month after the daily
surveys.
The unfortunate COVID-19 pandemic provides a rare opportunity for us to investigate
how humans summarize their positive and negative emotions from a long and
emotionally varied event in real life as well as the change of memory bias over time. We
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selected the first two months of the pandemic as the targeted time window based on the
belief that our participants’ emotions about COVID-19 would be more varied in the early
phase of the pandemic. Through daily surveys across two months to participants on
MTurk, we collected 84 participants’ daily general happiness and negative emotions
intensity on COVID-19. Through final surveys at a delay of one week and one month
after these daily surveys, we collected participants’ recalled average emotions for general
happiness and negative emotions on COVID-19. We explored what factors of the daily
emotions (e.g., the first day, the last day, the peak, participants’ current emotion)
contribute to the recall of their average emotions. We examined whether participants’
recall of their average emotions would be negatively or positively biased compared to the
true average of their daily emotions and whether the bias changed over time. Our study
sheds light on how humans summarize their daily emotions to form an overall evaluation
of their emotions over an extended period of time.

Methods
Participants
In order to have a statistical power of t-tests that can detect a day-to-day emotional
change of 20% with α = .05 and β = 0.2 and correlation analyses of α = .05, β = 0.2, and r
= 0.3, the sample size was determined to be 85. We started collecting data on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) for 160 participants who were in the United States
with a HIT approval rate > 95, with the anticipation that half of the participants would
continue to complete the follow-up surveys. Participants were recruited from the United
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States. Finally, we have data for 84 participants (48% Male, 51% Female, and 1% Other)
who have continued to complete the daily surveys and the final surveys (Mean: 44 days,
SD: 17 days).

Procedure
Daily Surveys: On every day from March 16 to May 11, 2020, participants reported their
emotions about COVID-19 on a Qualtrics questionnaire (Figure 4.1; blue, top).
Specifically, the question for general happiness was “In general, how happy do you feel
today?” on a scale of 1 to 7 (decimal numbers are allowed). The question for negative
emotions was: “At this moment, how strong or intense are your feelings about the spread
of coronavirus?” on a scale of 1 to 7 (decimal allowed), with 7 emotions to rate (sad,
angry, fear, frustration, confusion, shock, and stress). These questions were embedded in
other questions related to COVID-19 such as participants’ knowledge of COVID-19. The
time period was determined for the consideration of allowing variability of emotions
across days.

Final Surveys: One week and one month after March 11, 2020, participants reported their
memory of their average emotions about COVID-19 during the time they received the
daily surveys (Figure 4.1; purple, middle). Specifically, the question for general
happiness was “On average, how happy do you think you have been in general in the
eight weeks between March 16 and May 11?” on a scale of 1 to 7 (decimal numbers are
allowed). The question for negative emotions was: “On average, how strong or intense do
you think your feelings have been about the spread of coronavirus in the eight weeks
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between March 16 and May 11?” on a scale of 1 to 7 (decimal allowed) with 7 emotions
to rate as in the daily surveys. These questions were embedded in other questions about
COVID-19 to match the structure of the daily surveys. In order to retrieve participants’
emotions when they reported the average so that we can control for it in our analyses, we
asked participants to report their general happiness and negative emotions intensity in the
final surveys as in the daily surveys.

In order to retrieve participants’ memory of date-specific emotions, we asked participants
to fill out questions about memories of their date-specific emotions (Figure 4.1; dark
green, bottom). Participants recalled four personal events and four news headlines
between March 16 and May 11, with the order of the two kinds of memories randomized.
After the recalls, participants reported their memory of their general happiness and
negative emotions on the day these events happened on a scale of 1 to 7 (decimal
allowed). In order to retrieve the specific dates for these emotions, at the end of the
survey, we asked participants to identify the specific date these personal events happened
and the specific dates they learned about the news as accurately as possible. They were
encouraged to look up from their record or search on the web to be as accurate as
possible.
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Fig. 4.1. Schematic illustration of the timeline and the procedure of the surveys. Blue (the
top) indicates daily surveys. Purple indicates the questions about the overall emotions in
the final surveys. Green (the bottom) indicates questions for date-specific emotions in
final surveys.

Results
Because we did not have a prediction for the difference between the negative
emotions, we combined the intensitive of negative emotions by averaging across all the
negative emotions for the daily emotions, average emotions, and the emotions
participants experienced now when reporting the average. Figure 4.2 visualizes a typical
participant’s composite emotions reported in their daily surveys, the “reported
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average”(i.e., the average emotions participants reported in their final surveys), and the
emotions participants had when filling out the final surveys.
As visualized in Figure 4.2, we can thus identify participants’ emotions on the first day
in the two months, their emotions on the last day in the two months, the “peak” of their
emotions (i.e., the composite negative emotions and the general happiness at the highest
level), and the “trough” of their emotions (i.e., the composite negative emotions and the
general happiness at the lowest level) from the emotions reported in the daily surveys.
Importantly, we computed the “true average” (i.e., the average of the daily emotions of a
participant) from the daily emotions.

Fig. 4.2. Composite average of 7 negative emotions for a typical participant

Participants’ daily emotions significantly changed over time in the first two months of the
COVID-19 Pandemic
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In order to examine whether there is a day-to-day change in participants’ emotions for
the main analysis, we used a linear model to evaluate the effects of dates on daily general
happiness and negative emotions. We found that the date significantly predicted the
composite negative emotions, SSE = 99.3, F(1, 3620.2) = 277.59, p < 0.001, and
significantly predicted the general happiness, SSE = 26.3, F(1, 4781.5) = 49.93. These
results indicate that participants’ positive and negative emotions significantly changed
across days in the first two months of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Fig. 4.3. Participants’ emotion intensity for negative and positive emotions both changed
overtime. a) Intensity of negative emotions composite average across participants over
time. b) Intensity of general happiness average across participants over time. Higher
values indicate higher intensity.

Recalled average emotions accurately reflect true average emotions, but they are
negatively biased
In order to determine whether participants’ reported average emotions reflect their true
average emotions, we averaged the 1-week and 1-month reported average because they
highly correlated with each other and computed the correlation between this reported
average and the true average of participants’ daily emotions. The analyses showed a
significant positive correlation between the true average and the reported average for
their negative composite emotions, r(82) = 0.85, p < .001 (Figure 4.4), and their general
happiness, r(82) = 0.87, p < .001, which suggests that participants’ reported average
emotions accurately reflect their true average emotions.
Moreover, the bias (recalled average of participants’ composite negative emotions the true average of these emotions) was significantly higher than 0 (Wilcoxon signedrank tests: Z = 2.69, p = 0.007). On the other hand, we did not find the same bias for
general happiness (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: Z = 0.32, p = 0.749). Taken together,
these results suggest that although participants’ memory of their average emotions
accurately reflects the true average of their daily emotions, this memory was negatively
biased.
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Fig. 4.4. Participants’ recall of average emotions accurately reflects the true average of
their daily emotions, but this recall is negatively biased. (a) Participants’ reported average
in the composite negative emotions is significantly correlated with the true average in
their composite negative emotions. (b) Participants’ recalled average for their composite
negative emotions is more intense compared to the true average of these negative
emotions. For happiness, participants’ reported average is not different from the true
average. * indicates p < 0.05 by Wilcox test. The band indicates the median, the box
indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 × interquartile range,
and the solid points indicate outliers.

The peak significantly predicts the reported average even after controlling for other
predictors for negative emotions, but not for happiness.
In order to understand what factors contribute to participants’ memory of average
emotions, we fit a linear model on participants’ memory of average emotions with fixed
effects of true average across daily emotions (“true average”), their emotions at the time
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they reported the average (“now”), the peak, the trough, the first day, and the last day of
the daily emotions (Figure 4.2). For both general happiness and negative emotion
composite, we first added true average and then added now as fixed effects, after which we
added peak as a fixed effect (Table 1). For negative emotions, we found a main effect of
peak, SSE = 6.15, F(1, 80) = 22.15, p < 0.001 after controlling for true average and now
(Model 3 in Table 1). The effect of peak persisted after adding other covariates of first, last,
and trough to the model (Model 4 for Composite Negative Emotion in Table 1). These
results suggest that for negative emotions, the peak significantly predicts memory of
average emotions after controlling for other days of emotions.
However, we did not find the same effect on happiness. For happiness, we did not find
the main effect of peak, SSE = 0.05, F(1, 80) = 0.17, p = 0.682 after controlling for true
average and now (Model 3 for general happiness in Table 1). Similar to negative emotions,
we then added covariates of first, last, and trough to the regressions model as fixed effects
(Model 4 for General Happiness in Table 1). The model showed an effect of the first day,
SSE = 1.64, F(1, 60) = 7.18, p = 0.009.
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Table 1. Regressions for the recall of average emotions

To further contrast general happiness and negative emotions, we fit a mixed-effects
linear model on participants’ memory of average emotions with all fixed effects (true
average, now, peak, trough, first, and last) and an interaction term of the type of emotion
(happiness vs. negative emotions), and a random effect of participants’ ID. The main effect
of emotion type is not significant, SSE = 0.001, F(1, 121) = 0.005, p = 0.94. The only
significant main effects are now, SSE = 9.66, F(1, 121) = 38.93, p < 0.001, and peak, SSE
= 1.50, F(1, 121) = 5.98, p = 0.015. Importantly, there is an interaction between emotion
and peak, SSE = 3.62, F(1, 121) = 14.60, p < .001, and an interaction between emotion and
first day, SSE = 1.36, F(1, 121) = 5.49, p = .02. These results suggest that the factors that
contribute to participants’ memory of average emotions are similar but different for general
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happiness and negative emotions. In particular, how participants feel now contributes to
participants’ recall of average emotions for both positive and negative emotions. The peak
contributes more to participants’ memory of the average negative emotions compared to
general happiness. The first day contributes more to participants’ memory of average
general happiness compared to negative emotions.

Negative bias in recalled date-specific emotions decreased over time
In order to understand how summary statistics may influence participants’ recall of datespecific emotions, that is, whether participants’ recall will bias towards the summary
statistics over time (Zeng et al., 2021), we calculated the error of participants’ date-specific
emotions (“bias”) by subtracting their recall for the emotions at the day and their emotions
reported at that day.
Overall, the bias in participants’ recalled date-specific negative emotions was
significantly higher than 0, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: Z = 3.03, p = 0.002 (Figure 4.5a),
which suggests participants’ recall of date-specific emotions was negatively biased. There
was not a significant difference between the recall bias at 1 week or at 1 month for both
types of events (ps > 0.74). In order to further understand the change of negative bias over
time, we fit a mixed-effects linear model on participants’ recall bias with fixed effects of
delay in days and an interaction term of the memory type (personal events vs. news), and
a random effect of participants’ ID. The date of the recall, which is the delay, significantly
negatively predicts the recall error, SSE = 4.87, F(1, 306.12) = 5.37, p = 0.021 (Figure
4.5b). Other effects were not significant (ps > 0.47). These results suggest that although
participants’ recalled date-specific emotions were negatively biased at both time points,
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this negative bias decreased over time.

Fig. 4.5. Negative bias in the recall of date-specific emotions. (a) Bias in the date-specific
emotions participants reported for both personal and news events. The band indicates the
median, the box indicates the first and third quartiles, the whiskers indicate ± 1.5 ×
interquartile range, and the solid points indicate outliers. (b) The negative relation between
days of delay and the bias for date-specific emotions.

On the other hand, although participants’ recalled date-specific general happiness was
also significantly lower than 0, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: Z = 6.50, p < 0.001, we did not
find the same relationship between the delay and the recall error, SSE = 1.49, F(1, 265.76)
= 0.79, p = 0.37. Although we found a decrease in emotional memory bias over time for
negative emotions, we did not find evidence for the same change in negative bias for
general happiness.
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Discussion
We examined how humans extract the summary statistics of emotions from individual
experiences through two months of surveys at the beginning of the COVID-19 Pandemic.
We demonstrated a negative bias in the summary statistics extraction of emotions. In
particular, for the daily negative emotions, the summary statistics were recalled to be
more intense compared to the true average. Critically, the peak of the daily emotions
uniquely contributes to the summary statistics for the negative emotions. On the other
hand, memory for the individual events, which are the recalled date-specific emotions,
was also recalled to be more negative compared to the true date-specific emotions, but
this bias decreased over time. We think that the cognitive mechanism of summary
statistics functions differently for positive and negative emotions.
Our work integrates research in peak-end and research in long-term memory research
(Richards et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2021) by designing a paradigm that bridges the two
lines of research and tests the role of extreme items in the formation of summary
statistics. Our results that the peak uniquely contributes to the average negative emotions
are consistent with prior literature on the peak-end rule (Ariely & Carmon, 2000).
Although the surveys in this study do not cover the full scope of COVID-19 and therefore
do not really contain an end, this study adds to this line of prior work by demonstrating
the unique role of the peak in evaluating the summary statistics of emotions over an
extended period of two months, whereas the few prior studies of the longest period only
cover a week to a month and only tests hedonic experiences (Geng et al., 2013; Kemp et
al., 2008). Due to the pandemic, our study was able to demonstrate that the role of the
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peak may be different for positive and negative experiences in the same comparable
context and examine the role of the peak in emotions in an influential event in the world.
On the other hand, unlike past work in the peak-end rule, our study asked participants to
report “average” emotions instead of “overall” emotions, which transforms the paradigms
in the peak-end rule to fit the paradigms in long-term memory (Zeng et al., 2021). Our
current results benefit the long-term memory research literature by demonstrating that the
cognitive principle that extreme items contribute more to the summary statistics applies
to the domain of emotions, and maybe negative emotions only.
A few limitations of the current study should be noted about the contrast between
general happiness and negative emotions. First, the questions about general happiness were
embedded in a questionnaire on COVID-19. This context may encourage a negative bias
in recalling general happiness. A perfect control condition would be having another group
of participants fill out a series of surveys with the general happiness questions alone during
the early pandemic. Although it was impossible to return to the early pandemic and conduct
this control condition, the current results are consistent with findings from some prior
research on happiness Researchers tracked participants’ happiness during a week of
vacation, measured the overall happiness during this time, and did not find peak-end effects
on the overall happiness (Geng et al., 2013; Kemp et al., 2008). Moreover, by having the
current survey design, we allowed for a matched context between general happiness and
negative emotions. If it was the context of COVID-19 questions that determined
participants’ responses for all emotions, we should expect to see the same effect for general
happiness and negative emotions. For example, the “trough” of happiness should uniquely
contribute to the average happiness. However, we did not observe this effect. Another
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limitation is that the wording of the survey questions about general happiness do not match
the questions about the negative emotions, which was due to a consideration of avoiding
unnatural questions that ask participants how happy they are about coronavirus. It was
unclear how the different phrasing will influence the results. However, if we assume the
cognitive mechanisms apply to the extraction of summary statistics of all emotions to the
same extent. Our results, at the very least, show that the cognitive mechanisms of summary
statistics extraction do not apply to all emotions equally.
We found differences between the extraction of summary statistics for positive and
negative emotions and these results add to the literature on emotions. The peak influences
the overall emotions of negative emotions more than positive emotions, which provides
evidence for the theory that positive emotions facilitate global processing and negative
emotions facilitate local processing in long-term memory (Peng et al., 2022). Moreover,
our finding that emotions participants feel now contribute to the recalled average for both
general happiness and negative emotions adds new evidence to the memory
reconstruction framework in emotions, which proposes that memory of emotions is based
on an inherently reconstructive process and should be susceptible to biases for adaptive
values (Adler & Pansky, 2020). In particular, participants’ current emotions play a
special role in the reconstructive process of their past overall emotions. In addition, our
analysis showed that the negative bias for the memory of date-specific emotion decreased
over time, which added new evidence to the adaptive framework that positive memories
should be prioritized over time to maintain well-being (Adler & Pansky, 2020).
In summary, we have shown a negative bias in both memories of overall emotions
and memories of date-specific emotions that lasted over time, and that the negative
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emotion of highest intensity may uniquely contribute to the overall recall. However, the
negative bias for recalling date-specific emotions diminished over time. Moreover, we
found that positive and negative emotions vary in the extraction of summary statistics as
well as the change of bias in time. These findings provide new insights into the extraction
of summary statistics in memory and emotion.
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General Discussion

Our research explored the cognitive mechanisms of summary statistics across fields in
psychology, from memory and consolidation to emotion and motivation. Chapter 2 used a
spatial memory paradigm to demonstrate that the memory of summary statistics, initially
extracted from items, starts to bias memory for the items over time. A deviant item
changes the summary statistics extraction. Chapter 3 used the same paradigm to further
disentangle how different sources of item distinctiveness influence summary statistics
extraction. Chapter 4 extends this examination of summary statistics, especially the
influence of deviant items, to an impactful event in real life that lasts over an extended
period of time, COVID-19, and demonstrates a bias on summary statistics that may vary
by type of emotions.
There are generalities and specificities across various fields in psychology. For
example, Chapters 2 and 4 both show that extreme items uniquely contribute to the
summary statistics of the items in the lab and real-life events. Chapter 2 shows that an
outlier location that is deviant from others locations shifts the summary statistics of these
locations. Chapter 4 extends this rule to summary statistics of emotions during COVID19 by demonstrating a unique contribution from extreme emotions to the summary
statistics of the emotions for negative emotions. When evaluating the summary statistics
over time, the extreme items uniquely contribute to the summary statistics both in
memory of spatial locations and memory of emotions.
On the other hand, our results also suggest specificities in these fields and potential
interactions between domains in cognition. Although in Chapter 4 we found that the peak
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of emotions uniquely contributes to the summary statistics for negative emotions, we did
not find the same peak effect for positive emotions. Moreover, Chapter 4 detected a
negative bias in the summary statistics for negative emotions, but not positive emotions.
These results suggest that emotions may play a role in the extraction of summary
statistics, which potentially link to the adaptive values of memory to maintain well-being.
Chapter 3 manipulates the distinctiveness of the items and discovered that reinforcing an
item with various sources of distinctiveness will change its contribution to the summary
statistics. Despite similar levels of improved accuracy of the emphasized item, repeated
exposure distorted the gist memory by increasing the weight of this emphasized item,
whereas the reward did not. It is possible that the reward, through facilitating the same
neural network as summary statistics extraction, improves the integration across items,
balancing their weights, and thus protects the gist from being distorted. Alternatively, the
increased weight with repeated exposure may be due to the interferences from repeated
exposure on the processing of the summary statistics. This increased weight may be
specific to repeated repetition. Work can be done to continue to explore the factors that
will influence the weights of items to deepen our understanding of the mechanism of
summary statistics extraction.
In addition, working memory and long-term memory traditionally have been studying
summary statistics extraction separately, but their findings reveal similar phenomena,
such as memory of summary statistics being retained while memory for items being
discarded. Our work connects these two fields by creating experimental paradigms that
share commonalities in both fields. For example, Chapters 2 and 3 used a spatial memory
paradigm that allowed for weight computation for particular items, similar to ensemble
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perception literature (Whitney & Yamanashi, 2018). Chapter 2 found an increased gistbased bias on the memory of items over time. This bias in long-term memory mirrors the
gist-based bias in working memory research and suggests that the idea of a hierarchical
organization of memory may apply in long-term memory consolidation: as the
uncertainty of item memory increases, they are more biased towards the gist to improve
the accuracy of item memory retrieval (Brady and Alvarez, 2011; Lew and Vul, 2015;
Orhan and Jacobs, 2013).
Moreover, in working memory literature, outlier items tend to be discarded in
summary statistics (de Gardelle and Summerfield, 2011; Haberman & Whitney, 2010).
Chapter 2 discovered that the outliers contribute more to the explicit recall of gist
memory, but the outliers were discarded in the implicit center that biased item memories
over time. This implicit center that discarded outliers may reflect a sampling strategy in
long-term memory consolidation that is similar to the working memory literature (de
Gardelle and Summerfield, 2011; Haberman and Whitney, 2010). On the contrary, the
gist that overweighted the outlier participants reported may be associated with a sampling
strategy that is explicit and different from the gist extraction in working memory
literature.
To be more specific, when there are outliers in the group, the human mind may
automatically disregard the outlier and compute the summary statistics of the “median”
which excludes the outlier. This disregard is fast, effortless, and free from the need for a
deliberate recall of the individuals. This may account for what is found in the ensemble
literature and the gist-based bias center we found in long-term memory. On the contrary,
when there is an outlier but participants are asked to compute the average, which is the
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case in Chapter 2, participants have to consciously recall the outlier and incorporate this
outlier with the median to get the average, which shifts the weight of the outlier in the
average computed. This may account for the explicitly recalled center that overweighs
the outlier in Chapter 2. Our results offer a start for future research endeavors to further
understand the summary statistics extraction across ensemble perception and long-term
memory.
Why would the mind automatically compute the mean as opposed to the average when
there is an outlier? This mechanism may be of adaptive value. Imagine you are looking
for food in the forest. You have the memory that the food usually can be found at certain
locations, and you also have the memory that sometimes food shows up at outlier places
that are far from the majority of locations. Today, you need to look for food again.
Doesn’t it make more sense to disregard the outlier locations and check first at the
majority of locations where food usually is? This is similar to the median computation
discarding the outlier. Only when you cannot find the food at the majority of locations
will it make sense for you to resort to the outlier location. This conscious recall of the
outlier will then shift the weight of the outlier.
Will different decision processes involve different summary statistics computations
(mean vs. median)? When will it make more sense to compute the mean, as opposed to
the median? Sometimes the mean is fairer. For social categories, the default median
computation can lead to a bias. If people always disregard the outlier when forming an
overall gist of a social category, when most of the individuals in this social category are
associated with unfavored characteristics, the occurrence of an outlier with favored
characteristics will not change people’s impression of the group, even though a mean
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with the outlier taken into account is a more accurate reflection of the group summary
statistics. Understanding this mechanism of summary statistics extraction may help us
fight this bias in society.
Our current findings provide other interesting implications for stereotype formation in
the social category. For example, Chapters 2 and 3 both discovered the distinctiveness of
individual items will influence their contribution to the summary statistics. Chapter 2
provides evidence that the “gist” starts to stabilize and bias memory for individuals after
an extended period over time. Work in social stereotype formation suggests that after a
stereotype has been formed from accumulating experiences from individuals, judgment
on the group may be made from the abstract information independently of the individuals
(Sherman et al., 2013). It is still unclear how the experiences of the individuals will shape
the stereotype and the bias on social categories, and how these memories evolve over
time in society as it was hard to acquire a “blank” social group that participants never had
any experience with. Taking the question of gist memory formation to a greater scale, it
remains to be discovered how gist memory passes across generations over time to
become culture and history and shapes our personalities and behaviors (Schulz et al.,
2019). Our lab work offered a starting point to integrate the cognitive mechanism of
summary statistics extraction into a broader application of understanding gist memory
formation in society.
Taken together, these three chapters enlighten our understanding of how the human
mind integrates across individual experiences to form summary statistics over time by
bridging fields ranging from perception and memory to emotion and motivation. Our
work suggests possible generalities and specificities between these fields. They open up
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new possibilities for integrating theories for summary statistics extraction across the
fields, offer a promising start to deepen the research endeavor in summary statistics
extraction in human cognition, and provide implications and insights into understanding
human memory in society.
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